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Introduction
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a broad range of historical 
changes within all cultural, social, and political spheres of post-war Poland. 
Virtually every institution and ideological element of Polish society has 
been challenged and/or revised. The significance of these events with 
regard to regional and global affairs can not be overestimated. This does 
not mean, however, that concrete formulas, causal relations, or predictions 
of future events can be constructed and applied throughout Eastern 
Europe. Poland is Poland. It is not Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany 
or any other country. Important conclusions can be drawn, however, from 
examination of the Polish events of the 1980s. More specifically, this essay 
will attempt to improve understanding of the past role the Soviet Union 
has played Poland and the new role on which the Gorbachev leadership 
seems to have embarked. Through a comparison of Soviet involvement in 
the Polish events of the 1980-1981 Solidarity crisis with their role in the 
liberalization and restructuring of Polish society in the later half of the 
decade, significant reversal regarding several key elements of the Soviet- 
East European relationship will be demonstrated. Poland has challenged 
Soviet leadership and Bloc dominance throughout the decade. Thus, 
Soviet-Polish relations have evolved toward a situation in which the 
Kremlin must react to, rather than attempt to dictate, Polish policy and 
events.
By 1980 Poland was unparalleled as an important element in the 
strategic structure of the Warsaw Pact. Poland contains the largest
2population of any Soviet Pact ally. In addition, m  of 1980, its Gross 
National Product was $146.1 billion and the military contained 317,500 
uniformed personnel.1 Its geographic location between the USSR and Fast 
Germany and the historical position of the "Polish corridor" through which 
Western forces have repeatedly invaded Russia and the USSR, have 
combined to push Poland to the forefront of Soviet concerns throughout 
the post-war period. Thus Poland has been considered essential to Soviet 
defense since 1945.
Despite differences in strategic importance, culture, politics, and 
society, Soviet hegemony has created one commonalty among the nations 
and peoples of Eastern Europe, namely; a sense of oppression and 
constraint. Anti-Soviet sentiment can be found among large segments of 
the populations of virtually every East European country. In addition to 
Poland's history of discontent, reformist movements with anti-Soviet 
behaviors and rhetoric occurred in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 
1968. In addition, Yugoslavia and Albania chose "roads to socialism" which 
were not paved by Moscow. However, the temptation to over-simplify 
Soviet dominance as having had a unifying effect on the East European 
nations is perilous and unfounded.
In one sense the vast differences in culture, history, language, and 
society of the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe have proven to 
be insurmountable obstacles to any unforced cooperation between the 
countries. Secondly, situational elements have played a large role as well. 
In the event that one country's government attempted to stray from 
existing levels of Soviet hegemony, other Pact members have been
3unwilling to form any unified support for such change. Generally, 
however, it can be stated that, with the exception of the short-lived 
Czechoslovakian reforms prior to the Soviet invasion of 1968, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, and Poland have been the most consistently vocal in their plans 
and calls for reform and change. However, these countries have only very 
recently begun to cooperate with and support each other's respective 
reforms. This lack of cohesion has traditionally stemmed from fear of 
tying their own fates to risks taken by another government that might 
overstep Soviet parameters and bring down condemnation on all.
In examining these complex relationships it must first be understood 
that writing from the western vantage point brings with it certain 
limitations. Obviously much of the available information must be gathered 
through intelligence sources. The analysis of political and military 
situations and decision making proves increasingly problematic when it 
involves regimes retaining a tight hold on information throughout the 
society. Oftentimes it is very difficult from the outside to determine the 
importance of various situational elements that shape development.
The Sidney Ploss text Moscow and the Polish Crisis, employs an 
analytical study of Soviet propaganda in an attempt to reconstruct "the 
Soviet leadership's hidden policy objectives in the Polish crisis of 1980- 
1981."2 Ploss states, "The main function of Soviet opinion-makers, it is 
clear from educational texts, is to build confidence in the Politburo among 
officials and the public."3 He further asserts, "it is safe to assume that the 
Soviet audience must be supplied with data and commentary serving to 
justify policy decision that are extant or imminent."4 Thus Ploss examines
4Soviet propaganda because it prepares the Soviet populace for impending 
government action, justifies present or past action, and advances the 
perception that the government remains in control of any given situation. 
This essay will attempt to draw similar supporting evidence emerging 
from the Soviet media throughout the 1980s. It will also rely heavily on 
Ploss' evidence and reprints of Soviet sources from the early part of the 
1980s. While the Soviet media may have achieved greater freedom under 
Gorbachev it is by no means autonomous. Thus its news coverage, editing 
practices, and commentary may still be said to offer clues to the Soviet 
leadership's decision making and policies. !n fact, the increased tolerance 
for divergent views with the Soviet media allows for even greater insight 
into policy debates and disagreements among the leadership.
Propaganda analysis can not be said to be without its limitations. 
Without direct access to information through unrestrained freedom of 
speech, printed records of high level meetings, and/or direct intelligence or 
spying on the top leadership, gaps remain in the informational picture. It 
is important to avoid filling these gaps with mere conjecture by submitting 
to the temptation to oversimplify in analysis of social and political 
problems.
Several historical events and conflicts have helped to shape the 
popular opinion of the Soviet Union within the minds of the Polish people. 
Prior to the twentieth century, there were several prolonged periods of 
Russian dominance of Polish society. The 18th century was characterized 
by an almost complete control of Polish affairs and territory by the Czarist 
empire, while Russian troops repressed popular uprisings in Poland in
51830 and 1863. Throughout centuries of Russian-Polish relations there 
has been a continuous adversarial relationship between the Roman 
Catholicism of Polish society and pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodoxy.
This fact becomes especially important because it establishes a centuries 
old role for the Polish Church as a voice for oppressed Poles against 
Russian dominance.
The 20th-century historical wounds to the Polish consciousness have 
proven more difficult to reconcile because they were perpetrated by Soviet 
governments; thus blame cannot be cast on the imperialism of Czarist 
regimes. Events such as the 1920 Soviet-Polish War lie just under the 
surface of the "socialist family" propaganda pushed by Moscow. It is the 
events surrounding World War II and Stalin's atrocities that seem to have 
done the most permanent damage to the attitudes and opinions of the 
Polish people. The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact between 
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, that agreed on the partitioning of 
Poland between the two signatories, coupled with the massacre at Katyn of 
thousands of Polish military officers have remained unresolved points of 
antagonism for over 45 years. In addition, Stalin refused to aid a Polish 
uprising in Warsaw in 1944, allowing hundreds of thousands of Poles to 
die fighting the Nazi's as the Red Army sat a few short miles away. The 
Soviet forces wanted the Nazi's and the Polish Home Army to burn 
themselves out fighting each other before the Red Army push to "liberate" 
Warsaw was attempted. Stalin did not want the Poles to be governing 
themselves before the Soviets took control of Warsaw. Thus he could 
install a government answerable only to Moscow. Finally, Stalin's regime
6forcibly deported thousands of Poles to Soviet territory after the war, 
further inflaming Polish sentiment. The latter half of the 1980s has 
witnessed the advent of open discussion of these topics.
These events serve to reinforce the deep resentment of 
Russian/Soviet oppression. From the Polish perspective, imperialism has 
been no less a threat following the advent of Communist Russia than it had 
been during the Czarist period. Through a complex combination of these 
socio-political issues and economic factors to be discussed later, Poland has 
a post-war history full of unrest and dissent. The Committee for Worker 
Self-Defense (henceforth referred to as KOR) has maintained a small group 
of dissenters and government opponents. The KOR has traditionally based 
its opposition on ideological and socio-political areas. It has attempted to 
challenge both Polish and Soviet communists to account for the 
inconsistencies within their systems.
In Poland however, as elsewhere in the world, it has been economic 
issues and crises which have catalyzed popular unrest and social and 
political friction. Poland experienced periods of popular discontent and 
worker unrest in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81. Thus, in the 
twelve year period from 1968 through 1980, there were no less than four 
Polish national movements making demands upon the respective 
communist regimes. In 1976, when the Gierek regime rescinded the price 
hikes which triggered the unrest, the situation seemed to resolve and blow 
over. This fact seems to have reinforced the tendency in both Poland and 
the USSR to attribute discontent solely to economic factors. Hence, in 1980 
when price hikes once again brought on mass uprisings, the feeling was
7that the public and government would come to terms with the cost 
increases and the situation would gradually normalize.
Interestingly, Soviet willingness to allow a measure of economic 
reform in Eastern Europe throughout the 1970s and early 1980s in hopes 
of improving the region's economic performance may have led to the 
events that Soviet leaders most wanted to avoid - political reform which 
reduced the USSR's dominance of Eastern Europe. By allowing the 
governments of Eastern Europe to pursue more realistic commodity 
pricing, the Soviets may have created the economic impetus for unrest 
within Poland. Once the economic issues brought the populace into the 
streets, reform momentum became an accelerating phenomenon. As 
support for change grew and people saw that they could affect it, the scope 
of concerns and issues expanded to encompass the social and political 
realms as well. Thus from Solidarity's birth through its activities of the 
entire decade, it was and remains an organization aimed at affecting and 
transforming virtually all aspects of Polish life.
1
Setting the Stage for "Solidarnosc"
As stated previously, the Polish government continued to assert 
throughout the later half of the 1970s and into the 1980-81 crisis that 
Poland's problems were mainly economic. The communist regime 
repeatedly ignored the increasingly apparent political and social conflicts 
growing within both the population and the government. By the late
81970s observers of the Polish situation became convinced that the People's 
United Worker's Party (henceforth referred to as the PUWP) was in 
striking disarray on several key issue areas involving economic and social 
reform .1 The moderates within the Party were increasingly put on the 
defensive and they became dangerously polarized in opposition to the old 
guard hardliners. A serious conflict developed between domestic 
pressures and Soviet policy assertions. The PUWP fell into an internal 
struggle over Soviet communist orthodoxy's opposition to specific reforms 
and actions needed to address Poland's growing problems.
Criticism of Soviet domination of all areas of Polish life was extensive 
in samizdat publications by the late 1970s. In fact, by 1978 at least 
twenty regularly circulating samizdat publications with over 20,000 
subscribers were in existence.2 There was a growing feeling that Poles 
should attempt to make Poland a model for East European development 
rather than an example of Soviet hegemony.
The mid-1970s dealt Gierek's Poland several economic blows from 
which it could not recover. The Soviets moved to raise the price of oil 
exported to Eastern Europe in order to bring it more in line with the world 
market price. In addition, Western Europe experienced a recession which 
greatly reduced any demand for Polish exports. In 1976 Gierek attempted 
to reduce domestic consumption and product subsidies by raising food and 
other primary commodities costs. Food prices shot up an average 70% and 
Gierek was forced to rescind the increases when nation wide strikes and 
unrest broke out.3 His regime largely wasted huge sums of capitol and 
subsidies for socialized agricultural programs which make up only 30% of
9the country's total agricultural sector.4 For the 70% of Polish agriculture 
which remained private, Oierek did almost nothing to improve conditions 
or raise productivity.
Economic mismanagement and lack of reform were accentuated by 
gross overborrowing from the West. Use of the loans for subsidies and 
mere maintenance of the economic status quo, rather than investment in 
future growth, wasted this capital and forced additional borrowing to cover 
debt services.* This economic downturn was accompanied by several 
important political factors. Throughout the 1970s the overt Soviet control 
of Eastern Europe began to decline as Detente increased the region's 
contacts with the West. Western interaction affected virtually every 
aspect of Eastern European societies. Cultural, economic, even political 
information began to be exchanged on levels with at least some popular 
accessibility.
In Poland, with the advent of the 1980s, production actually began to 
decline and goods shortages reached chronic levels.6 In the years from 
1970-1975, wages in Poland increased 56% while the cost of living rose 
only 12.7%.7 In comparison, the average wage hikes from 1976-1980 of 
33.4% coupled with a cost of living increase of 27.2% look dismal.8 
Through the squandering of loan capital Oierek raised expectations to 
unsustainable levels in the early 1970s. When economic realities failed to 
match these high expectations, people's faith in the regime became further 
undercut.
Even more damaging to public's confidence in the government, the 
loan capital, which was being used for price supports, came up short in
10
1980 resulting in inflation in the prices of food and domestic goods.9 The 
final blow to popular sentiment towards Gierek's economic policies seems 
to have come in February of 1980. Following the eighth PUWF Congress of 
February 11-15, 1980, it became clear that the Gierek government refused 
to accept any responsibility for Poland's declining economic situation. 
Furthermore, no substantive plan of action was adopted to fight off the 
impending crisis.10 The effect on the people, especially the workers, could 
not help but be significant. Faced with economic crisis, their government 
simply refused to acknowledge the problems. By attempting to free itself 
from any responsibility for past, present, or future actions, the PUWP 
reaffirmed its inability to affect change in Poland.
Complete public dissatisfaction proved to be perilous for the regime. 
Public support for government, its officials and its policies, can be said to 
be largely based on the concept of legitimacy. This is not to say that 
governments can not rule without legitimacy; they can and do. However, 
the distinction between power and legitimized authority became so wide 
within Polish society in the early 1980s that control suffered measurably. 
In Poland the legitimacy of the communist system has never been 
grounded in public satisfaction or participation. The ideological, socio­
economic, and political structure were all imposed by the Soviets. Thus, 
ideological legitimacy, if it ever existed, had no real chance of being 
sustained.11
Eastern European regimes, Poland being no exception, have relied 
heavily on military security and economic gains to legitimize their rule. 
With the advent of the Prague Spring and Brezhnev's succeeding
statements, military legitimacy became questionable as the distinction 
between Eastern Europe's "enemies" and "allies" grew unclear. With the 
relatively sharp economic downturn of the late 1970s, the Eastern 
European countries, most notably Poland, found themselves facing a 
complete legitimacy crisis. The point being, when some form of legitimacy 
exists the populace is more likely to accept short term economic or social 
problems by deferring gratification of their material and/or ideological 
wants. Lacking this confidence and trust in their government, Poles sought 
avenues for the expression of their mistrust and disillusionment. As 
evidence of this legitimacy erosion, Solidarity published its "Thesis" on 
April 20, 1980, stating that a vast majority of Polish workers considered 
communist ideology to be irrelevant.12 Since the Polish government 
attempted to build political, economic, and social structures around 
communist ideology, it was very significant that the workers expressed 
such a profound lack of confidence in their society's supposed foundation. 
Obviously, this continuing demoralization could have no other effect than 
to enhance the countries falling production, alcoholism, and an ever 
increasing cynicism toward the communist institutions.13
The Eurocommunist movement of the 1970s also contributed to the 
legitimacy problems of the Eastern European regimes. As a result of 
Poland's greater media openness (relative to many of its Pact allies) this 
movement may have had a more significant impact within Poland. The 
Eurocommunists challenged the notion that the Soviet model of 
communism was the only or best path. In January of 1978 a 
Eurocommunist seminar entitled "Problems of the History of the USSR" was
12
very critical of Soviet style socialist development.14 it launched a direct 
attack on Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet actions in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968.15 Throughout 1979 Kremlin leaders attempted to 
pressure Bloc regimes to close ranks with regard to the Eurocommunists.16
The stage was set for a major conflict between the Polish populace 
and the ruling communists. After all, unrest, rioting, and striking in Poland 
had previously led to leadership changes in 1956 and 1970. Furthermore, 
widespread worker opposition to the government created civil strife in 
1968, 1970, and 1976 as well. Prior to the price hikes that would 
eventually trigger nationwide strikes and launch the country into a crisis, 
there emerged increasing conflict in two other traditional problem areas of 
post-war Polish society. The first was the issue of censorship and the 
repression of dissent. These two characteristics of Soviet style communism 
have met with constant and persistent opposition in post-war Poland.17 
With the advent of Detente and the lower Soviet profile of the 1970s, the 
Polish movement to loosen control of information and the exchange of 
ideas gained momentum. Secondly, with the election of Cardinal Karol 
Wojtyla of Krakaw to the Papacy, the Church’s position in Poland was 
greatly enhanced. The Church's place as the centuries old protector of 
Polish identity took on increased significance. The position of the Polish 
Pope in the Vatican enhanced the international power of the Polish Church 
as well as reinforced the perception that it is Poland's only institution 
worthy of popular confidence and trust. In fact in 1977 then Cardinal 
Wojtyla openly supported the KOR dissident group following the beating 
death of a student by government personnel.18
13
As political and economic factors waxed simultaneously in 1980, 
Edward Gierek was forced to reduce subsidies and raise food prices. He 
resolved to bring meat supports to manageable levels. Amidst other cost 
increases the price of meat jumped 30-90% on July 1, 1980.19 Work 
stoppages began immediately. Gierek committed his government to these 
policies and vowed not to reverse the price hikes.20 On July 2, Warsaw's 
Ursus Tractor workers went on strike. By August 14, over 50,000 workers 
at the Gdansk shipyard had halted production. On August 15, the Soviet 
news agency TASS announced what would prove to be the first of many 
well publicized Warsaw Pact military exercises in the territory 
surrounding Poland.21 The meat price hikes of July 1, 1980, signaled the 
beginning of the end of the Gierek regime. Despite the widespread unrest 
and opposition which created similar price increases in 1970 and 1976, 
Poland's communist leaders did not seem to anticipate the reaction of their 
citizenry. Only by rescinding the 1976 increases was Gierek able to diffuse 
the situation. When he resolved not to take this path again, he committed 
the government to a showdown with the workers.
It is interesting to note how quickly the political, cultural, and social 
issues of the period joined ranks with the economic agenda that sparked 
the uprising. The Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II emerged 
almost instantly as involved actors. It is impossible to determine the 
effect of these religious players on the situation, but it seems worthy to 
note that the 1980-81 movement proved to be much less violent and 
bloody on the part of the protesters that were the riots of 1979.22 The 
continuous calls for peace and restraint from both the Vatican and the
14
Polish Church coupled with the strong links the emerging opposition 
leaders developed with Church leaders, may have been significant factors 
in avoiding violence. In fact, in a November 6, 1980 issue of London's The 
Guardian. Lech Walesa listed many individuals from within the Church 
establishment as his leading advisors.23 He also credited the 1979 Papal 
visit as having helped fan the flames of the growing nationalist sentiments 
and provoking the subsequent striking.24 Given Soviet ideology and views 
toward religion and religious institutions, indeed any relatively 
autonomous institutions, this heavy Church involvement can only have 
been a source of anger and apprehension in the Kremlin.
Small established opposition groups such as the KOR may have been 
initially surprised by the strikes which swept the nation, but they soon 
closed ranks to support the strike organizers. Poland's underground 
information dissemination and its samizdat publications proved very 
effectual. Organized opposition figures exploited their connections with 
Polish intellectuals and Western media personnel in order to spread strike 
information throughout the country.25
By mid-August 1980 strikes, protests, sit-ins, and work stoppages 
became widespread across the entire nation. Virtually no aspect of the 
economy remained unaffected as strikes expanded from their industrial 
base to include many key aspects of the service sector. Calls for 
independent labor unions also began to escalate. Gierek's commitment to 
holding his ground on the price hikes was reinforced by his hardline 
response to KOR and strike leaders as they attempted to advise strikers 
about labor unions. Key figures in the KOR opposition were arrested on
15
August 20 and 21 in an attempt to squash the activists from spreading the 
idea of free trade unions. In conjunction v/ith the aforementioned August 
15 announcement regarding military exercises, Moscow began launching 
attacks on revisionist communists reminiscent of rhetoric prior to the 1968 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. This initial posturing set the stage for the 
events of the succeeding 16 months. The Polish workers, led by Solidarity, 
continued to make demands that their communist government was unable 
to meet as Moscow cranked out a continuous stream of warnings, threats, 
and policy assertions. Polands communist government remained locked in 
the impossible position between its people and the Kremlin.
The agreements between strikers and the Polish government on 
August 20, 1980, here after referred to as the Gdansk Accords, launched 
the country on the path toward independent trade unions and mass 
participation in demands for political and social change. Polish 
government negotiators accepted demands for the curbing of official 
censorship and the organization of independent labor unions with the right 
to strike and the curbing of official censorship. In return, the work*, 
delegates officially acknowledged the PUWP's leading role in Polish politics 
and society and proclaimed their adherence to the socialist alliance and the 
responsibilities of said alliance. Although the Soviet press refused to 
report that Polish workers were to be allowed to form self-governing labor 
unions, a September 1 article in Pravda implied that Poland's leadership 
had mistakenly agreed to "examine" some terms put forth by "antisocialist 
elements" linked to Western intervention.26
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On September 6, 1980 Stanislaw Kania, Politburo member and Party 
secretary for Security and Church Affairs, was ejected First Secretary of 
the PUWP during and emergency meeting of the Polish Central Committee. 
Just as in 1956 and 1970, popular unrest forced a leadership change as 
Gierek was ousted from power. Brezhnev quickly sent a letter of 
congratulations to Kania. The letter, reprinted in Pravda. appeared to be 
more an outline of what the Soviets expected of the new Polish leadership 
than a congratulatory message. The letter calls on Kania to be a "staunch 
fighter" in favor of "strengthening the leading role of the Party."27 Kania, 
however, did not launch himself headlong into the traditional rhetoric of a 
Soviet disciple. He did not concentrate his criticism of the striking workers 
on supposed "antisocialist" or "Western" forces. Unlike Gierek, Kania does 
not seem to have dismissed the unrest as a phenomenon that could simply 
be repiossed and/or waited out. This lack of an immediate hardline 
response to the situation may have created instant doubts within Moscow 
and Polish conservative circles in Kania's ability to deal with the growing 
crisis.
In Kania's initial statements, including his inaugural address, he 
praised the Soviets' understanding and support as they allowed the Poles 
to solve their own problems.28 Statements of this kind were directed at 
both the Soviet leadership and the Polish people. Kania attempted to buy 
more time and Soviet patience even as he reminded Poles of the threat of 
Soviet intervention if the situation proceeded too far. As has often been 
the case within the Soviet press, its omissions were as important as its 
inclusions. For example omitted aspects of Kania's inaugural speech,
17
including his statements on reform negotiations, the role of the Polish 
Church, and the Gdansk accords, might have caused concern in Moscow 
that he was too lenient and open to discussion of issues which Moscow 
considered non-negotiable.29
Throughout September and October reform momentum continued to 
grow within both the popular movements and the government. On 
September 17, hundreds of free trade unions converged on Gdansk to 
register as one large labor movement called ''Solidarnosc" or Solidarity.
The fact that these unions registered as a unified group could not help but 
strike fear into Polish and Soviet officials alike. By early October. Kania 
was addressing a spectrum of problematic issues confronting, in varying 
degrees, all of the socialist states. He acknowledged low productivity, 
shortages, low levels of discipline and public information, the shortfalls of 
central planning, and the entangled lines of Party-State authority only to 
name a few. However, potentially more shocking to the Soviets were his 
proposals for "partnership" or "co-management" of power and decision 
making between workers, professionals, and young people coupled with 
discussions of reform within the inner-party's roles and terms of office.30
Kama's continued reformist positions placed him firmly in the line of 
fire between Solidarity and the Kremlin. He was faced with the impossible 
task of attempting to please these opposing forces. As soon as November 
of 1980, it became painfully clear that he was failing to please or appease 
either side. The end of October 1980 was dominated by controversy over 
the Polish high court's recognition of Solidarity's official registered status. 
Solidarity issued a demand stating that the Polish premier must travel to
Gdansk to negotiate with the union or face a new wave of national strikes. 
The strikes were set for November 12. Although, the strike was avoided, 
Solidarity's issuance of an ultimatum to the government moved the union 
yet another step closer to control of some aspects of political power. This 
fact, coupled with Kama's acceptance of Solidarity's legal status may have 
sealed the fate of the 1980-81 Solidarity movement by solidifying 
Moscow's complete opposition to it. These events were immediately 
followed by an intense push by both the Polish and Soviet media to 
encourage the Party's hardline supporters and discredit Solidarity as 
"antisocialist" in nature.
The Soviet official statements continued to adhere to their traditional 
assertion that Western subversion was inciting the Polish situation. On 
December 4, 1980 a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry accused 
Western governments and officials of "waging psychological warfare on 
Poland."31 Just four days later a fabricated TASS report appeared, carried 
by Czechoslovak, East German, and Bulgarian media, detailing an ousting of 
representatives of official trade unions in favor of "antisocialist" 
replacements.32 A U.S. Department of State document claimed that this 
falsified report was intended to evoke "the memory of similar fabrications 
as part of Soviet preparations for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia."33 
In other words, the accusations against the West and the report may have 
been intended to point out to Polish leaders that Moscow had taken action 
before to bring a Part member back in line and they could do so again.
Kania fought to maintain his position on his political tightrope 
throughout early December in an attempt to allay some Soviet fears. In a
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December 2 speech to the Central Committee of the PUWP, reprinted in 
Pravda the following day, Kania proclaimed that Solidarity was a "worker's 
movement" dominated by law abiding citizens with few links to 
"imperialist subversion . . . hostile to socialism."34 He went on to state that 
the Polish government "shall act resolutely against all symptoms of 
ideological unity and actions against the Party's ability to act."35 Despite 
its omission of Kama's more conciliatory words, Pravda's lengthy coverage 
of his statements seemed to indicate that there remained, among the 
Soviet leadership, some level of support for his continuation in the 
leadership of the Polish government. However, it became increasingly 
difficult for the Kremlin to trust the PUWP to resolve the crisis in favor of 
communist power as the majority of Party rank and file members joined 
Solidarity.
Richard Krickus, in conjunction with the ideas of Abraham Brumberg, 
has developed seven general factors, to be expanded upon later, to explain 
the Solidarity phenomenon of 1980*81. In summary, they are the 
following:
1. The Gdansk shipyard workers were undaunted by fears of the 
regime. They were better educated and young - a testimony to the 
failure to create legitimacy of the communist controlled educational 
and socialization systems.
2. Intellectuals such as KOR members and university faculty worked 
and communicated well with workers and their leaders. (This 
continued in earnest even after the martial law declaration.)
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3.. Intellectuals, workers, and PUWP rank and file were appalled 
and disenchanted by the level of corruption and repression within 
the regime.
4. Twenty years of increasing levels of education and urbanization 
increased both the awareness and acuteness of Poland's problems. 
(Even Marx said these were factors leading to revolution.)
5. High levels of economic growth and consumer expectation, which 
were fueled by Western loans, were crushed as the economy failed to 
sustain either one.
6. Trade unionism has a relatively significant history in Poland.
From the 19th century through the interwar period, Polish workers 
have organized in pursuit of economic and conditional demands.
7. The Polish government failed to eradicate or discredit the role 
of the Catholic Church. The Polish Church, as the only institution in 
Poland possessing mass legitimacy and support, played a key role in 
Solidarity's rise.36
In a matter of only a few months following the coastal strikes, Solidarity 
had acquired 9 million members within an electorate totaling only 26 
million.37 From spontaneous strikes spawned by price increases, Solidarity 
rapidly became a massive centralized organization working for across the 
board societal change. Simply stated, Solidarity completely usurped the 
Party's claimed role as the voice and protector of the masses.
21
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The Soviet Threat
Soviet reaction to the growing crisis in Poland was partially based on 
the fear that the "Polish disease" might spread to other East European 
countries and/or into the USSR itself. In short, the Kremlin had a great 
deal at stake with regard to the risks of reform or unrest. Even as the 
Soviets refused to report the initial strike activity in Poland there were 
reports of limited illegal strikes within the USSR as well.1 These reports 
remained unconfirmed; however Soviet Labor Organizer Vladimir Borisov 
happened to be expelled from the country in late June 1980. When Polish 
unrest was Anally acknowledged by the Soviet media, the Soviet public 
remained ignorant of the Polish government's recognition of strike 
committees as negotiating partners. It is clear that the Kremlin worked to 
avoid popular knowledge of Polish government acceptance of strike 
negotiations because of the fear that Soviet workers might choose to 
embark on a similar course. Even as the media attempted to avoid inciting 
the Soviet workers it began calling for greater emphasis on consumer 
goods production. Pravda ran theoretical articles on October 2 and 3 and 
November 21 suggesting that the Soviet economy had attained a stability 
that would allow it to place higher levels of resources into the area of 
consumer products in order to alleviate shortages.2 By omitting and 
editing the events in Poland and simultaneously calling for domestic 
economic changes desired by consumers, the Soviets exposed their anxiety 
regarding possible parallels between the Polish crisis and their own
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situation. Pioss stated that his "propaganda analysis" also suggests that 
Brezhnev and the leadership's moderates became increasingly concerned 
about the possibility of unrest in the absence of any real gains in the 
standard of living.3
Through Pravda. 15 September 1980, the Soviet leadership was able 
to encourage Polish hardliners to wrestle control of the PUWP while at the 
same time warn members of the CPSIJ of the fate of liberalists or 
reformists. The article, in support of purging the PUWP ranks, states the 
following:
Unity must first of all be ideological unity. This means that there 
must be unanimity in the party's rcnks with respect to the main 
principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology . . . There is no place in the 
party's ranks for those who failed to pass the tests of recent events, 
those who were not only unequal to the occasion but also took non- 
party positions on a number of basic questions . . . The question now 
on the agenda is that of purging the party's ranks.4
Clearly the Soviet party-state hierarchy was attempting to insulate the 
USSR from Poland's problems as it created ever increasing pressure on the 
Polish government to crack down and halt reformism.
To minimize the threat of any spread of the Polish reformist ideals 
and unrest, the Soviets, in conjunction with their other Pact allies, devised 
several means by which to seal off Poland. These containment practices 
included extensive military maneuvers which virtually encircled Polish
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territory, jamming Radio Free Europe, and implementing travel and 
currency restrictions to and from Poland, its Bloc allies, and West 
Germany.3 This isolation put pressure on the PUWP to hold the line 
against reform and pushed other East European nations closer to the Soviet 
alliance in the event that consolidation for military intervention was 
needed.6 This unified front within the Pact allowed the Soviets to appear 
prepared to act in the event that the Pact alliance was disrupted by a 
national Polish transportation strike or the country's deterioration into 
violence and/or anarchy. Again, placing blame on Western subversion 
served as the rationale for cutting off contact with Polish ideas and events.
This consolidation of the Warsaw Pact with regard to Poland was 
consistent with all accepted tenets of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." This 
doctrine of relations among East European socialist nations emerged 
following the Soviet led Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was 
formulated through several media and policy statements following the 
1968 invasion and occupation. The following are statements from a 
Brezhnev speech at (ironically) the 3th Congress of the PUWP on 12 
November 1968:
Socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all 
countries. We resolutely oppose interference in the affairs of any 
states and the violation of their sovereignty . . . (but) when external 
and internal forces hostile so socialism try to turn the development 
of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the 
capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in
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that country . . . this is no longer merely a problem for that country's 
people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist 
countries.7
In addition, Bloc supremacy over national sovereignty can be traced to the 
following excerpt from the letter sent to Prague on IS July 1968, signed by 
the leaders of five Pact countries:
The undermining of a Communist Party's directive role leads to 
elimination of socialist democracy and the socialist system. That 
creates a threat to the foundations of our alliance and the security of 
our countries' community.8
The Brezhnev Doctrine serves as the source of such warnings as the 
one sent by the Warsaw Pact Emergency Summit of 5 December 1980 in 
the form of a communique. After stating confidence in Poland's ability to 
solve its own problems, the Pact leaders asserted, ". . . Poland had been, is 
and will remain a socialist state, a firm link in the general family of the 
lands of socialism."9 Such statements made it clear that Polish 
governmental power would not pass into non-communist hands and 
reminded the Poles of their place in, and responsibilities to, the Warsaw 
Pact. Whether or not other Bloc leaders agreed that Poland should or could 
solve its own problems became relatively unimportant as the Soviets 
reasserted their ultimate control of the alliance.
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The period from the Prague Spring to the mid-1980s was 
characterized by statements and catch phrases indicative of "Brezhnev 
Doctrine" philosophy. For example, Eastern Europe was said to exist in the 
realm of the "limited sovereignty" of "socialist internationalism" which was 
to be enforced by "fraternal assistance."10 These terms tended to be 
defined by the Soviets on a situational basis to justify the means being 
employed at the time. These policies were usually said to preserve the 
"historic gains of socialism." Given this background, it did not prove 
difficult for the Soviets to hang a persistent threat of military intervention 
over Poland simply by recreating the rhetoric and policies that preceded 
the Czech invasion in 1968.
The Soviets have pushed ideological unity throughout the post-war 
period. Only during Khrushchev's tenure and his "separate roads to 
socialism" were doctrinal variations permitted. During the 1970s the 
Brezhnev regime oversaw a growing emphasis on ideological consolidation 
and orthodoxy. As a result of the Czech invasion and the growing 
importance of Detente era Western contacts, ideological socialization was 
dramaticaf’y expanded.11 The political and economic crisis in Poland 
demonstrated the rejection of this increased Sovietization.
Soviet reactions became distinctly more hard line and intolerant as 
Kania's government continued to negotiate with and concede to Solidarity 
in November and December of 1980. On November 10, high level meetings 
took place at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw between Polish and Soviet 
officials. Despite Soviet demands to reject legal registration of Solidarity 
the Polish Supreme Court decided to legalize the independent union just
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hours after the meeting.12 Then Politburo member and Party Secretary 
Konstantin Chernenko immediately condemned Kania's "capitulation" 
stating that Solidarity was incompatible with the Polish system of 
government and must be subjugated.13 "Capitulation" is a negative term 
for conceding or buckling under on an ideological issue. Allowing the 
legalization of Solidarity may very well have been the beginning of the end 
for Kania. Unlike Gierek whose fateful move was in conflict with the 
demands of the Polish people, Kania opposed the desires of his Soviet 
Allies.
Kania, however, was also trying to demonstrate his own strong-arm 
tactics by raiding Solidarity headquarters to confiscate documents and 
make arrests. Many of those taken into custody were soon quietly 
released. Military intervention became an increasing concern through the 
second week in December. Soviet and Pact troops massed on the borders 
and set up communication and supply posts as Walesa and other Solidarity 
leaders began to caution strikers about possible military actions they 
might incur.14
Sidney Ploss outlined four general options for the Soviet course of 
action at this and subsequent critical points in the Polish crisis. They are 
the following:
1. A little or no action option accompanied by verbal condemnation 
and criticism. This could result in a loss of control and influence 
throughout Eastern Europe and lead to discontent in other Bloc 
nations.
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2. Demonstrate military force on the borders and put the PUWP 
under intense pressure to resist reform and hold to hard line.
3. Demonstrate military force on the borders and induce the Polish 
government to crack down on reformists and "normalize" the 
situation. (This option will eventually be the one of choice in 
December 1981.)
4. Use direct military intervention as in 1956 and 1968 to crush 
opposition forces and place pro-Moscow hard-liners in leadership 
positions.15
Each option has its own risks. However options 3 and 4 appear especially 
ominous as they contain the possibility of inciting anarchy or civil war 
which could lead to heavy casualties and Soviet occupation. In December 
of 1980, the Soviets chose option 2 and avoid the risks of military 
involvement or the duplication of the quagmire in Afghanistan. However 
the voices of intolerance and orthodoxy continued to gain strength 
throughout the months to follow.
The events of February 1981 solidified the path down which 
Solidarity was to travel. As Brezhnev reasserted the Brezhnev Doctrine at 
a CPSU Congress he treated the situation in Poland as an attack on all Bloc 
"socialist gains."16 At the same time the Eighth PUWP Congress, under 
pressure from the Soviet supported hard liners, failed to produce any 
substantive plans for reform in any political, social, or economic spheres. 
Vladimir Wozniuk posits that, had the Soviets permitted gradual reform to
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emerge from this Congress, there might have been a chance of avoiding the 
eventual crack down.17
3
The Road To Martial Law
On 9 February 1981 Polish Defense Minister General Jaruzelski 
ascended to the premiership as social tensions continued to grow.
Obviously this appointment of a traditionally hard-line general served to 
appease some Soviet fears. By March the Polish economy was experiencing 
chronic shortages of raw materials, spare parts, and foodstuffs as both 
worker and farmer productivity decreased.1 At the same time Moscow 
kept the pressure on by expanding and extending military maneuvers 
around Poland. On March 3 and 4 Kania and Jaruzelr.ki led the Polish 
delegation to high level talks in Moscow. Le Fiyuro reported that the 
Polish leadership was expressly informed that their policies and 
concessions were completely unacceptable.2 The Kremlin's ability to 
intervene reinforced the notion of "limited sovereignty" and diove the 
point home.
The Soviet policy of encouraging Polish hard-liners continued in 
earnest. Stanislaw Kociolek, installed as the new First Secretary of the 
Warsaw Communist Party, repaid the Kremlin for its support by 
condemning all strikes as political in nature.3 The New York Times. 14 
April 1981, reported that only through a direct call by Brezhnev to Kania 
during a recess of the March 29-30 PUWP Central Committee Plenum were
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Party Secretaries Tadeusz Grabski and Sefan Olszowski, both hard-line 
traditionalists, not ousted from power.4 Thus the evidence suggests that 
Kremlin anxiety regarding the Polish crisis had resulted in almost direct 
Soviet control of Polish Party-State affairs.
By placing the Polish government over a barrel, the Soviets 
effectively created an atmosphere of tension involving all of Poland's 
principle actors. Moscow was trying to prevent further concessions by the 
Polish state. In early 1981 the Polish government was avoiding the issues 
of Rural Solidarity's recognition, the reduction of the work week's total 
hours, the elimination of Saturday from the work week, and greater 
Solidarity access to the media. As summer approached Kania was 
negotiating all of these points and showing signs of conceding. In fact, the 
Polish media and Solidarity publications were becoming increasingly 
pointed in their criticisms of many Soviet taboo subjects in political and 
social, as well as, economic arenas. However, some aspects of the Soviet 
policy intentions were effectual. For instance, Solidarity was growing 
factionalized and defiant. By July, some trade groups were defying 
Walesa's advice to refrain from striking.3 This created the lack of a unified 
opposition the communists so desired and the out of control feeling they 
most feared. This lack of control would later contribute to the end of the 
early 1980s reform period.
On 5 June 1981 a pointed and threatening letter from the CPSU to the 
PUWP summed up the Soviet view of the situation in Poland (see Appendix 
2). The letter expressly attacked the leadership and policies of Kania and 
Jaruzelski. Furthermore it warned the Polish leadership of the fate
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awaiting sympathizers of the reform. The letter so resembled one sent to 
Czechoslovak leaders in 1968 that the Polish leadership could not ignore 
it.6 This type of correspondence illustrated that the Brezhnev Doctrine 
remained the rule of order in Moscow. As expected, Kania, Jaruzelski, and 
other moderates retreated slightly to allow conservatives a greater voice.7
July, however, brought Polish moderates back in force as the Party 
attempted limited democratization at its Ninth Extraordinary Party 
Congress. A new Central Committee consisting of 20% Solidarity members 
and only 8.5% Party professionals emerged from the Congress.8 After 
becoming increasingly ostracized, Kania was replaced as First Secretary of 
the PUWP on 18 October 1981 by General Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski continued 
much of Kama's course while emphasizing order and control in Polish 
society. He seemed to earnestly seek reconciliation between Poland's 
citizens and the regime. Jaruzelski, much to the dismay of the Soviets, 
pursued talks with both the Church and Solidarity in search of ways to 
resolve the situation.
Solidarity called its own two-part congress in September and 
October. Sidney Ploss summarized the major Solidarity demands which 
emerged from these congresses as follows:
- free national and local elections
- public control of mass media
- economic reform through authentic self-management
- elimination of the Party's right to make appointments
- Westernization of the legal system.9
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These demands, accompanied by an expression of support for those 
working for the establishment of free trade unions in other Bloc countries, 
were characterized by the Pact as an overt threat to socialist systems 
throughout Eastern Europe. Undoubtedly even the moderate communist 
leaders of the region were shocked and outraged by these statements. 
Following the second session of the Solidarity Congress the movement's 
leaders stated their intention to uphold Poland's responsibilities to its Pact 
allies, but this seems to have been too little, too late.
Several days after the issuance of Solidarity's demands a "Statement 
of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Government" was delivered to 
Kania and Jaruzelski. Summaries of the text were carried by Warsaw 
Radio and Pravda. The letter called for the elimination of any public or 
Solidarity access to the media, the disbanding of Solidarity, and the end of 
"anti-Soviet" activities.10 The letter, once again, made it clear that the 
Soviets were prepared to actively intervene via the Warsaw Pact if 
communist control in Poland was not reasserted.
On 13 December 1981 General Jaruzelski's communist government 
declared a state of emergency in Poland and invoked martial law. The 
majority of liberal reforms gained during the previous seventeen months 
were abolished. Solidarity, as a legal institution, was crushed. Its 
founders, leaders, and sympathizers found themselves imprisoned. Prior 
to the martial law declaration Solidarity had taken on an increasingly 
demanding and confrontational tone. However, it is commonly 
acknowledged that preparation for the crackdown must have been ongoing
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for several weeks. U.S. President Ronald Reagan, on 23 December 1981, 
stated that intelligence sources indicated that the martial law declaration 
had been written in Moscow in September.11 In any case outside forces 
greatly influenced the decision to halt reforms.
It is important to note that conservative communist throughout the 
Bloc played a role in pushing for a crackdown. Their official and media 
statements were highly critical of the Polish reforms. By mid-1981 most 
moderate Bloc leaders had ceased to assert Poland's sovereign right to 
solve its own problem. Anxiety regarding the possible spread of unrest 
pushed the Bloc communists toward the Soviets' anti-reform stance.
From a Soviet standpoint, the martial law option appeared to be an 
excellent choice. Direct military intervention seems to have been only a 
last ditch option, to be used in the event that the imposition of martial law 
had failed. Direct intervention would have greatly damaged Moscow's 
Western agenda and destroyed ties with Western communists. In addition, 
there was a risk that Poles would resist a Soviet invasion and transform 
the situation into a high casualty operation.12 This was especially 
unattractive given the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, a 
massive invasion of Poland could have unified the NATO countries and 
enabled Reagan to lead them into a relatively severe diplomatic and 
economic reaction. Ironically, delivering a speech at a Kremlin dinner in 
honor of a Jaruzelski-led Polish delegation on 1 March 1982, Brezhnev 
claimed that the martial law imposition was a "national decision taken by 
our Polish friends."13
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Given the Polish history of unrest and the regime's lack of legitimacy, 
a mass movement in support of governmental and societal change may 
have been inevitable. In 1980-81, however, the prevailing international 
and intra-Bloc relationships did not permit such demands to be realized. 
Kremlin philosophy continued to operate on the basis of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine whereby the internal developments of East European nations are 
subject to evaluation and approval from Moscow. In addition, Solidarity, 
or the Polish populous as a whole, seems to have underestimated the 
communist's power to subjugate the movement. As a result, the Polish 
reform experiment of 1980-1981 came to a close, driving its leadership 
and ideology underground.
4
The Changing Face of the 1980s
The execution of the martial law dictates appeared, from the Soviet 
vantage point, to be extremely successful. Solidarity was outlawed and 
disbanded and political and social reforms were greatly turned back. 
Although the opposition's direct access to the media came to an end, 
relative to other communist-state bureaucracies the Polish media 
remained fairly open and trustworthy. Perhaps most significantly, these 
measures were accomplished with almost no violent confrontation or 
casualties. "Solidarity," however, remained within the consciousness of the 
Polish people. In the years following the crackdown it came to symbolize 
the freedom and hope of the Polish struggle. The imposition of martial law
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by the Polish army enhanced the Polish populace's disillusionment with 
their governmental institutions. They were shocked that the armed forces 
allowed itself to be used against its own people. The martial law 
declaration confirmed the Polish Communist-state's reliance on military 
force, rather than public legitimacy, as the determinant for governing 
power.
Martial law produced relative political stability on a short term basis. 
Jaruzelski moved quickly to normalize Polish society, even releasing Lech 
Walesa and other Solidarity leaders as early as 1982. However, the 
prevailing conservative atmosphere refused to allow progress toward 
reform within the economic structures. Since the economic situation did 
not improve and political stability was maintained by force or the threat of 
it, a majority of the Integral elements leading to recurrent Polish unrest 
remained unaddressed. Economic reform became virtually non-existent in 
the first years following martial law. Poland experienced a decrease in the 
standard of living and was unable to create enough wealth to maintain 
already inadequate levels of societal infrastructures such as education, 
water, electricity, and other public services.1
Once again, Poles turned to the Church as the only legitimatized 
structure in their society. They looked to Church leaders and priests to 
protect the Polish nation and culture.2 In addition, the Church's role as an 
ongoing link to the West was perpetuated by the Polish Pope's continued 
presence and outspoken support in the Vatican. Throughout the 
"normalization" period, Catholic priests developed a reputation as the only 
individuals able to speak frankly about the regime. Jozef Cardinal Glemp,
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Roman Catholic Primate of Poland, walked the fine line between defiance 
and acceptance. The 1984 murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko by Polish 
security forces, however, further drove the Polish people toward the 
church and the Polish clergy toward links with underground Solidarity 
activists.3
In addition to the ever-increasing ties between Solidarity activists 
and the Church, the 1980s witnessed growing ties between the activists 
and Polish intellectuals as well.4 Throughout Eastern Europe, and 
especially In Poland, intellectuals and professionals have traditionally been 
grossly underpaid and de-emphasized by official Soviet-style economic 
doctrine. In tact, Polish intellectuals experienced a disproportionate fall in 
their standard of living as a result of a rising cost of living which remained 
unmet by increases In their regulated salaries.5 Furthermore, as the highly 
educated sector of Polish society, intellectuals stood to benefit from the 
liberalizations called for and achieved by Solidarity prior to the crackdown.
The single most important factor in the evolving face of Polish-Soviet 
relations was Gorbachev's ascension to power. Almost immediately he 
began to set a new tone for Kremlin leadership. For the first time in the 
post-war period sweeping economic and political reforms were being led 
by Moscow. Gorbachev openly acknowledged the inadequacies and 
shortages which have characterized communist economic and political 
systems. It became increasingly clear that the hard-line conservatives in 
Eastern Europe were out of step with the growing reformism in the USSR. 
Czech dissident Jiri Dienstbier characterizes this phenomenon by referring 
to the aged and stagnant East European leaders as "Brezhnev's orphans."6
In addition to domestic economic and political reforms, Gorbachev 
renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine and called on the East European 
Communist Parties to pursue reformist paths of their own.
Popular negative perceptions of the communist-led governments 
throughout the region rose as cracks in the wall of censorship and 
repression began to surface. Housing shortages and poor construction 
quality, inadequate water, electric, telephone, and other public services, 
growing urbanization, and their governments' lack of effective plans to 
confront these problems all contributed to citizenry dissatisfaction. A 
growing environmental crisis and a younger generation which grew up 
with unmet expectations and exposure to Western culture solidified the 
perception that change must he affected. As in the pre-crisis eta of late 
1970s Poland, long-standing political and social issues seem to be waxing 
in importance at precisely the same time.
Gorbachev continued to push out the old guard within the USSR. By 
example, he placed indirect pressure on Eastern Europe to do the same. Irt 
addition, he strongly criticized the policies of hard-liners in all areas, both 
domestic and international. Although spoken in reference to Soviet 
conservatives, his words, "Restructuring and reform demand new men," 
echoed throughout Eastern Europe.7 Reconfirming the changing 
relationship of Soviet-East European relations, the Soviet Union signed the 
East-West Stockholm Agreement on 19 September 1986. Article IS of this 
document, expressly aimed at intra-Warsaw Pact relations, states the 
following:
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(The signatories) win abide by their commitment to refrain from the 
threat or use of force in their relations with any state, regardless of 
that state's political, social, economic or cultural system and 
irrespective o f whether or not they maintain with that state relations 
of alliance (emphasis added).*
Clearly, Soviet rhetoric and expressed policy toward Eastern Europe 
had changed under the Gorbachev leadership. The sincerity of those 
policies, however, can only be confirmed if put to the test. During the late 
1980s Poland became that test, continuing to challenge the extent to which 
Moscow was willing to relinquish control in Eastern Europe.
The catalyst for change within Poland was once again affected by 
Solidarity. Driven underground, but not destroyed, by martial law, 
Solidarity activists and demands became increasingly republicized. As 
Gorbachev consolidated his power in the USSR, Jaruzelski openly expressed 
his support for the Soviet leader's ideas for reform in an attempt to create 
publicized PUWP support for communist-led reform. The Solidarity 
members' commitment to its ideals and the underground's growing ties 
with other sectors of Polish society allowed it to first survive and then 
flourish throughout the normalization period. The fact that Solidarity's 
leaders were able to keep the 1980-81 activities non-violent demonstrated 
one aspect of the membership's devotion and the leadership's ideological 
control.9
Although technically an independent trade union in 1981, Solidarity 
took on social and political implications from the beginning. This is best
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expressed by in the organization's own words from its platform of late 
1981. The following statement demonstrates Solidarity's 
acknowledgement that it was not a mere economically based labor 
organization. "What we had in mind were not only bread, butter, and 
sausage, but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, 
freedom of convictions and the repair of the republic."10 Given this 
foundation and the growing openness touted by Gorbachev and endorsed 
by Jaruzelski, it is not surprising that Solidarity re-emerged as a 
movement of social, political, and economic scope. The surprise came as 
Solidarity emerged from seven years in the underground to directly 
challenge the PUWP for power.
5
Solidarity's Re-emergence
Jaruzelski's support for Moscow's calls for reform began to be tested 
in 1987 and 1988. As limitations on speech, public gathering, and 
protesting were gradually loosened in Poland, ex-Solidarity leaders, 
intellectuals, and youth organizations moved their grievances from the 
alternative press into a more public forum. More importantly, worker 
unrest became a perpetually growing phenomenon. Run away inflation 
and rapid pay increases threw the economy into an inflationary spiral. 
Solidarity signs and symbols, as well as those of other newly founded and 
more radical organizations appeared with growing frequency.
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In in attempt to demonstrate a Polish version of Gorbachev's 
glasnost, restrictions on the public dialogue regarding social and economic 
issues were curtailed. In fact, on 30 November 1988 Lech Walesa 
appeared on a live televised prime-time debate with Alfred Miodowicz, the 
government's head of the All-Poland Tirade Union Alliance and a member 
of the Politburo. Walesa clearly implied that the former Soviet leadership 
was to blame for the imposition of martial law and the crushing of Polish 
reforms in 1981. He stated the following:
In 1980-81, external conditions did not allow the reforms Solidarity 
wanted. As I said once, Brezhnev lived two years too long.
(Brezhnev died in 1982.) Now those opportunities exist, but we are 
not taking advantage of them. Instead, we are trying to save the 
Stalinist model.1
With their increased exposure, opposition leaders continued to push for the 
return of Solidarity's legalized status. Although the government engaged 
in dialogue regarding political, social, and economic issues during 1988, 
only after Jaruzelski committed to serious round-table discussions, do 
these negotiations produce significant results.
Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Rakowski pushed the Communist Party 
and Parliament to agree to engage in talks designed to lead to some type of 
legalization fix Solidarity. Rakowski informed other Party leaders that the 
"risks" of relegalizing Solidarity were necessary if Poland was to emerge 
from its crisis state.2 There were reports in Polish and Western media that
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JaruzeUki threatened to resign if the Party rejected negotiations with 
opposition leaders. As a result of Gorbachev's more open leadership, Polish 
Communist moderates were now able to express their belief that Poland 
needed the support of its people to rebuild the economy after years of 
abuse.
Walesa, although conscious of his limitations, refused to take on a 
conciliatory tone toward the Communist government. On February 6, in his 
speech addressing the opening session of round table negotiations, Walesa 
attacked Poland's governmental structure and its inability to manage the 
economy. Walesa remarked,
We know it - the country is ruined . . .  but it wasn't some elves who 
ruined it, but a system of exercising authority that detaches citizens 
from their rights and wastes the fruits of their labor.3
Even in this atmosphere of ongoing negotiation, economic factors were 
forcing workers toward unrest. On 8 February 1989, two days into the 
round table negotiations, a government spokesman confirmed that 173 pay 
disputes and 39 strikes were ongoing.4
As a clear sign of Polish frustrations, these small protests and 
isolated strikes were becoming increasingly violent. Clashes between 
security police and strikers and/or protesters grew more frequent. This 
violence, however, most often occurred during non-Solidarity organized 
activities. Younger, more militant groups such as the "Federation of 
Fighting Youth," "Confederation for Free Poland," and "Independent
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Students Union" provoked security police end denounced Solidarity's 
willingness to negotiate with the Communists. As a result of this recurrent 
striking and unrest, Jaruzelski, in a speech to military and security 
personnel on 27 February 1989, made it clear he would once again use 
military force to ensure stability in Poland.9
Throughout these Polish developments Moscow remained supportive 
and encouraging, calling on the PUWP to lead the country toward economic 
recovery and greater political freedoms. Early March 1989, witnessed the 
printing of an interview with Lech Walesa in the Soviet weekly publication 
New Times. Walesa was cautious in hit. responses, concentrating on 
Solidarity's desire to work with the PUWP for the betterment of Poland.9 
Walesa had experienced a remarkable recovery within the Soviet media 
from his 1981 status as one of the "provocateurs" and "hirelings of 
Washington," to his 1989 characterization as a "man of principle."7 
Through this forthright and historically open coverage of Polish events and 
opposition leaders, it was clear that the Soviet leadership supported the 
path Jaruzelski was pursuing.
Following five weeks of ongoing negotiations, the government 
announced in early March 1989 that an agreement had been reached on 
democratic reforms within the government and the restoration of 
Solidarity's legal status. The deal called for the resurrection of Poland's 
upper house of Parliament, or Senate, to be made up of freely elected 
representatives. Furthermore, 35% of the seats in the lower house of 
Parliament were to be opened up to free and open elections. The 
remainder were to be retained by the Communists and their allied parties.
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In exchange for these reforms, Solidarity accepted the creation of a 
presidential position of broad powers of domestic and foreign security. In 
addition, the president retained the right to dissolve the Parliament. The 
position was to carry a six-year term with the option of election to one 
additional term.
It is clear that the intention to elect Jaruzelski to the presidency 
remained ever-present throughout negotiations of the agreement. This 
pacified Polish hard-liners and other communist leaders t* * rnghout the 
Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, by retaining control of 65% of the lower house, 
the communists never imagined that they would lose power following the 
elections. Thus, the agreement was originally designed to give Solidarity a 
strong voice in government and force it to take on some responsibility for 
Poland's problems while retaining the ultimate control of the PUWP. 
Bronislaw Geremek, senior Solidarity negotiator, characterized the 
atmosphere surrounding the agreements by stating, "A process has begun 
under which democracy is to be rebuilt in an evolutionary manner, not 
upsetting the political balance or stability.''8
One month later, 5 April 1989, the pact was signed and its scope 
became clearer. In addition to electoral and governmental restructuring, 
the agreement authorized a legal opposition media. There were to be daily 
newspapers ind weekly television and radio programs reserved for 
oppo if on's views. In addition, general reform goals were mapped out in 
the areas of agriculture, health care, and environmental clean up. The 
formation of other legal, non-communist groups was also spelled out. 
Furthermv" , the government announced that it had reached an agreement
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with the Chuich by which legal status would be granted the Polish Catholic 
Church for the first time in communist history.
At least on paper, the round table pact established planned reforms 
to affect all aspects of Polish life. Noticeably absent, however, were 
substantive steps to improve the economy. These issues were put off until 
the establishment of Solidarity as a participant in government. Despite the 
fact that the PUWP had eve 7 intention of retaining government control, it 
would need the support and involvement of Solidarity to aid in gaining 
public acceptance of the painful steps toward economic recovery.
If Poland's government is to move toward economic reform, it must 
first attain some level of legitimacy and/or support from the populous. If 
every step is met with striking and unrest the Polish economy will never 
expand. Waiesa and other Solidarity leaders continued attempts to gain 
public confidence while, at the same time, retaining Kremlin support by 
attempting to establish and maintain a sense of controlled, gradual change 
(in contrast to the unrestrained reform momentum of 1980-81). Walesa's 
saying, "the safe road is the evolutionary road," characterized the 
opposition's new, less revolutionary approach to reform.9 Detailed Soviet 
media coverage of the round table agreements indicated their interest and 
support for Polish reform. Despite the fact that Polish reforms began to far 
outstrip those within the USSR, the entire spectrum of Soviet media 
continued to encourage and accurately report the changes within Polish 
society.
Despite the fact that the Polish Communists pushed for June elections 
tather than give Solidarity until the fall to organize, the PUWP suffered the
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most resounding defeat in communist history. The Solidarity movement 
did not experience any splintering, producing unified support for all of its 
candidates. Opposition candidates won 99 of the 100 available seats in the 
newly created Senate and virtually all of the contested seats in the lower 
house. The message from the Polish populous to the PUWP was clear; pure 
dissatisfaction had produced a mandate for change. Such a complete 
rejection of a power-holding communist party had never been experienced 
before. The future of Poland's leadership was thrown into uncertainty.
In an attempt to organize the new government, General Jaruzelski 
was formally elected to the office of the presidency on July 19 by a joint 
session of the Polish Sejm (the lower house) and the new Senate. The 
opposition made it clear that they would not serve in a rubber-stamp 
legislature. Following extensive debate, Jaruzelski was elected by a vote of 
270 to 233 with 34 abstentions.10 Never before had so great a legislative 
fraction publicly voted against the advancement of a communist leader. 
When he assumed the presidency Jaruzelski remained First Secretary of 
the PUWP. However, he quickly relinquished this position and officially 
separated the leadership of the Party from the leadership of the state.
Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, 
who took over following Jaruzelski's resignation, the PUWP continued to 
make uncalculated political mistakes in the weeks of disarray which 
followed the election. Rakowski named General Czeslaw Kiszczak as 
Poland's next Prime Minister. This position, however, is subject to the 
approval of the Parliament. Walesa led the attack on Kiszczak in order to 
halt his confirmation as Prime Minister. The choice of General Kiszczak
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proved to be unwise given his close association to the military's execution 
of martial law. The opposition took advantage of this perception with 
masterful skill. Parliament rejected General Klszczak's appointment to the 
position thus becoming the first legislature in the Bloc to refuse such a 
nomination.
After rejecting PUWP offers to join a grand coalition government, 
Solidarity began courting the small parties allied to the communists. Since 
the communists had offered Solidarity none of the most powerful cabinet 
posts ia the Coalition, it was a simple matter for Solidarity's leadership to 
justify refusing to form a government under the PUWP's conditions. The 
nomination and subsequent rejection of General Kiszczak, however, gave 
Solidarity the issue it needed to pry the United Peasant's Party loose from 
its alliance with the PUWP. The Democratic Party followed the United 
Peasant's lead and jumped ship to join Solidarity. Suddenly Solidarity had 
control of the necessary votes to elect a Prime Minister from among its 
ranks. Given the resounding defeat suffered by the communists, it was 
understandable that its allies would desert to the other political camp. 
However, given the context, it was a bold step. Poland had definitely 
tested the lengths of Soviet tolerance for reform and independence.
Solidarity leader and editor of its weekly newspaper, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, was elected Prime Minister by the National Assembly. 
Immediately, Mazowiecki began to form his cabinet. In order to pacify 
both Moscow's anxiety and the PUWP, the Ministries of Defense and 
Interior were earmarked for communist control. This was an attempt to 
assure both domestic and Bloc communists that Poland's military and
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police establishment would not be dismantled or significantly tampered 
with.11 Mazowiecki's cabinet emerged in the following manner:
11- members from Solidarity
1- Independent-Solidarity Sympathizer (Foreign Ministry) 
4- Communist - PUWP 
4- Peasant Party 
3- Democratic Party.12
During their confirmation hearings, cabinet members pledged themselves 
to return Poland to a market-based economy, the privatization of 
government monopolies, and the search for war reparations from the 
Soviets.13 In addition, members from all parties continued to warn Poles 
that inflation and unemployment would worsen before they improved. 
Prime Minister Mazowiecki appealed to the West for aid and advice even 
as he reaffirmed Poland's commitment to its Warsaw Pact 
responsibilities.14 In the end, Mazowiecki's cabinet was confirmed by a 
large majority of the National Assembly as communist floor leader Marian 
Orzechowski called on his party to support the cabinet appointees.
Once the new government was established, Polish officials turned to
I
the country's dire economic situation. The economic crisis forced the 
government to take immediate steps toward reducing subsidies, 
encouraging private investment, and closing and or scaling down 
unprofitable enterprises. Polish Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, 
Poland's "architect of economic policy" assured Polish officials and citizens
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alike that the government was prepared to pursue these painful policies.15 
The nation's food system was the first to experience restructuring to 
incorporate market forces. In past years wage increases greatly 
outstripped food price hikes. Consequently food markets were greatly 
destabilized.15 Demand increased without a corresponding growth in the 
amount of product as private sector Polish agriculture became less 
profitable. By releasing the food system to market forces the government 
hoped to alleviate shortages in production and profitability problems.
The United Peasants Party strongly supported the switch to market 
based economic forces within the agricultural sector because it created 
monetary incentives for producers. The All-Poland Trade Union Alliance, 
however, remained opposed unless a wage indexing law was also put into 
effect.17 The Sejm passed such a law providing for quarterly wage hikes of 
80% of the price increase index. The new food structure system went into 
effect in August of 1989. Producers withheld their product for weeks 
prior to market value increases causing further shortages and longer lines. 
Initially prices shot up at an extraordinary rate. For example, in one week 
sugar rose 42%, butter 77%, flour 100%, and ham 277%.18 In the weeks 
that followed prices tended toward stability and, in some cases, slightly 
decreased.
Jeffrey Sachs, professor of economics at Harvard University and 
advisor to Solidarity, stated that such realistic market pricing must also 
occur for gas, fertilizers, and rent if the governmental budget is to be 
balanced.19 Sachs warns, "it's not impossible to imagine chaos in Poland 
leading to some form of Soviet intervention, which could risk the entire
4 8
Gorbachev experiment throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."20 
Professor Sachs made these points in arguments for large scale Western 
assistance for Poland. Nevertheless, his point is well taken. Poland has 
only begun its path toward a market economy and possible prosperity.
The worst and most painful steps lie ahead. Some Polish government 
officials estimate that fully one-third of Polish workers will lose or change 
jobs as a result of upcoming economic reforms.21
Solidarity is banking on its political legitimacy, gained through free 
elections and substantive plans for reform, to encourage patience and 
short-term sacrifice within the Polish citizenry. The fact that these price 
hikes are being led by a government of democratically elected origins may 
aid Poland in avoiding the unrest brought on by Communist led price 
increases in 1956, 1970, 1976, 1980 and 1987. If the reaction to the food 
product inflation of August, 1989 is any indication, Poles appear, at least 
for now, to being willing to cooperate with and trust their new 
government.
J. F. Brown asserts that aside from political and economic reforms, 
Eastern European countries must change the nature of their relationship to 
the Soviet Union in order to gain significant legitimacy levels.22 The new 
leadership in Poland seems to be aware of the importance of establishing 
distance between itself and the Kremlin. Despite Gorbachev's popularity 
and dynamic leadership, Poles want a government that calls its own shots, 
rather than one that falls in line behind Moscow's lead.
Both Solidarity and the Polish communists have been quick to point 
out the boldness and history making quality of Polish reform. Polish
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Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewtki (Solidarity), in his first major 
policy statement given at the U.N. General Assembly, stated that Poland 
"has no intention of destabilizing the existing international order," however 
he also asserted that "spheres of security can never mean spheres of 
influence."23 Foreign Minister Skubiszewski further assured his Pact allies 
that Poland would adhere to "existing treaties," however, "such respect 
does not impose any limitation regarding the choice and change of the 
system of government."24 Clearly, the Polish government has attempted to 
establish its sovereignty in both domestic and foreign affairs.
Skubiszewski attempted to place Poland not only at the forefront of reform 
within the Bloc, but also as a leader in Europe as well. He stated, "We 
(Poland) shall contribute to the re-creation of a united Europe in which 
Poland should have her place."23
The present Polish leadership must operate entirely in uncharted 
political and economic territory. As Lech Walesa stated, "Nobody has 
previously taken the road that leads from socialism to capitalism . . .  We 
have Western nations as an economic and political model."26 The West 
may serve as an eventual model, but it offers few answers as to how to 
execute the transformation. In addition, the question of how deeply the 
Soviets are willing to allow Western influence to run remains to be 
answered. As a result of the dismal state of the Soviet economy, Poland 
has only the West to turn to for large sums of additional aid and 
investment.
This loss of some dependence on the USSR can only result in further 
Polish independence from Soviet dominance. Tens-of-thousands of Polish
so
bureaucrats owe their positions to the Party, as do the vast majority 
economic managerial job holders. These people may become anxious and 
uncooperative if reform penetrates too deeply into Polish state structure. 
For now, Solidarity leaders have assured Party bureaucra t that they will 
not purge them from the government. However, moves toward a market 
economy and the elimination of party privileges will undoubtedly threaten 
thousands of party bureaucrat positions within Polish society. One 1981 
Solidarity demand which broke Soviet taboos regarding the nomenclature 
system was the call for open, "competitive appointment procedures."27 
Gorbachev too, has placed the party's control of appointments to important 
posts out of the reach of perestroika. The maintenance of the 
nomenklatura system in Poland perpetuates the exclusion of groups such 
as the intellectuals and young people from the bureaucratic and 
administrative positions.
As Polish reforms surpass the scope of those proposed in the Soviet 
Union, evidence of a growing Soviet anxiety emerged. In the months 
preceding the June elections Soviet media treated Solidarity leaders with 
encouragement and support, often praising their efforts to work in 
conjunction with the PUWP. This was in sharp contrast to the negative 
coverage they received during the 1980-1981 crisis. However, with the 
crushing defeat of the PUWP some discord appears to have surfa< a within 
Soviet coverage and reactions to Polish developments. Both Pravda and 
Izveatia reported the election results with accurate and frank statements; 
however, praise for past PUWP accomplishments, work for "one Poland," 
and commitment to reform was extensive.22
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The lavcatia coverage by L. Toporkov reported that the PUWP had 
"suffered a defeat unprecedented in the 43 year history of people's 
Poland," however, he went on to say that the election results were an 
"injustice" because the PUWP had shown a willingness to institute 
reform.29 These remarks were consistent with opinions stated in a 
January 1989 article praising Polish reforms and dialogue. The column 
characterized Poland as "entering a quantitatively new stage of the 
renewal of its political system. Thanks to the bold steps it is taking the 
Party again commands authority and trust."30 Before and after the 
election, the Soviets refused to acknowledge the failure of the Polish 
communist party. There was no evidence to suggest that the PUWP 
possessed any degree of public support, confidence, or legitimacy for at 
least IS years prior to the election. Yet Moscow, even in a period of 
openness and reliability within the media, refused to acknowledge this 
fact.
Izveatia went so far as to suggest a number of causes for the PUWP's 
defeat in order to avoid the Polish people's lack of attachment to or trust in 
the Party. Reasons such as the opposition's campaign style, rhetoric, 
emotional appeal, and attacks on past communist regimes were cited as 
was the PUWP's inexperience in a competitive electoral setting.31 The 
article asserted that the election results would paralyze the Polish 
government and render it unable to execute progressive reforms. In 
addition, Izveatia launched a scathing attack on Solidarity for refusing to 
join Jaruzelski's proposed coalition government.32 The latter point was 
made prior to Solidarity's formation of a non-communist government. The
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feeling in the Kremlin appears to have been one of fearful apprehension 
regarding the destabilizing effects of Solidarity's pursuit of power.
During the period of Solidarity's negotiations with the United 
Peasants Party and the Democratic Party a spokesman for the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry admitted that the Kremlin leadership was "very 
concerned" about the Polish situation.33 He added, "we do not intend to 
interfere in the internal affairs of that country."34 Soviet editorials from 
this period repeatedly imply that a Solidarity government could destabilize 
the Bloc and all of Europe.39 Although careful to clarify that the formation 
of a government was an internal Polish affair, both Pravda and the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry accused Solidarity of complicating the Polish situation 
with political moves in pursuit of governmental power.39 Moscow's 
unqualified praise and support of Polish reform was interrupted as 
Solidarity approached governmental control. In addition, the Soviets never 
conceded that the Polish people's rejection of the PUWP was 
understandable given the state of Polish affairs and historical events.
Poles have never taken up the flag of communist revolution on a massive 
scale. The 1989 election was the first opportunity they were given to 
express their political frustrations.
It seems highly unlikely that Jaruzelski would have given support to 
a Solidarity-led government without having had some type of approval 
from Moscow. The least that can be said, given the relatively low levels of 
anti-Solidarity rhetoric in Soviet media and government statements, is that 
Gorbachev did not attempt to block the non-communist government
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ascension to power. Very likely he fave explicit consent for such an 
arrangement after Solidarity gained Parliamentary control.
In terms of a strict definition, the Brezhnev Doctrine can be said to 
be dead. This is not to say that Soviet military or political intervention will 
never re-occur. It is to say that the term "Brezhnev Doctrine" carried with 
it a level of expectation as to what was permissible within the Bloc. The 
reforms and structural changes now taking place in Poland, as well as 
elsewhere in the Bloc, most definitely fall far outside anything that would 
have been acceptable during the Brezhnev era. This period of Soviet 
leadership was characterized by the Kremlin's struggle to maintain Soviet 
hegemony in Eastern Europe. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze summed up the Kremlin's new attitude toward its Bloc allies 
in remarks regarding Poland. In an address to the ll. N. General Assembly 
he stated the following:
It is no secret that we were not enthusiastic about the election 
setback of the Polish Communists. Nor should it be a secret that we 
hope that they can overcome die crisis. Nevertheless we see nothing 
threatening in the fact that in accordance with the will of the Polish 
people a coalition government has been formed . . .  We are in no way 
prejudiced against that government. We wish it every success and 
ate ready to cooperate with it most acdvely. Tolerance is the norm 
of civilized behavior.37
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Following an initial period of uncertainty, Moscow again attempted to 
present unified support for Polish reforms.
Two phrases in Mr. Shevardnadze's speech stand out as worthy of 
examination. The first is his assertion that Moscow was not threatened by 
Polish events. It seems clear, from both media and governmental 
statements, that this was not initially the case. As a result of the 
innovative character of the new policy toward reform in Eastern Europe, 
traditional anxieties and ideas appear to have surfaced in the confusion 
following the PUWP's crushing defeat. The second phrase of note is 
"Tolerance is the norm of civilized behavior." The choice of the word 
tolerance may be important. "Tolerance" rather than "cooperation”, 
"coexistence", or "understanding" implies unequal relationship. Tolerating 
the Polish reforms still carries with it the implication that the Soviets 
retain the option to stop being tolerant if their patience with Poland 
expires. Although matters of linguistics or semantics, these details from 
the U. N. address lend insight into the changing Kremlin's attitudes and the 
retention of remnants of traditional philosophy.
Given recent developments throughout Eastern Europe it can be said 
that the Soviets relinquished their claim as the one, true socialist model. 
Consequently, the CPSU will not serve as the only structural model for East 
European Communist Parties. The PUWP was forced to reevaluate 
virtually every aspect of its structures, policies, and membership. The 
Party, having recently begun to formulate plans for its future, will 
assuredly emerge in a vastly different role than it has traditionally played. 
As in the case of the Hungarian communists, it may choose to so
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completely reorganize itself that it actually becomes almost unrecognizable 
as a Bloc communist party. It remains to be seen whether it can gain a 
significant following among the Polish populace allowing it to survive in 
the increasingly competitive arena of Polish Politics.
Solidarity, conversely, must effect a level of change and economic 
prosperity in order to retain its popular support. Change within the Polish 
political sphere was radical and rapid in 1988 and 1989. Solidarity must 
transform the inadequacies and inefficiencies within the Polish economy 
without upsetting the tenuous political situation. Attaining governmental 
power in Poland is a decidedly mixed blessing; Solidarity has assumed 
responsibility for Poland's economic performance. It mus execute the 
painful steps toward economic efficiency. It must also avoid raising 
economic expectations that it cannot meet. Solidarity will be forced to 
walk a tightrope of drastic economic reform while attempting to maintain 
public confidence and order.
6
The Gorbachev Era
On 6 July 1989, in the midst of the Polish electoral and governmental 
confusion, Gorbachev delivered what may be his most important statement 
regarding Bloc relations. During his Strasbourg address to the 23-r.ation 
Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev stated the following:
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Social and political orders in one country or another changed in the 
past and may change in the future. But this is the exclusive affair of 
the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in 
the domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of 
states - friends, allies, and others - are inadmissible.1
(See Appendix 3)
In light of the reforms in Poland, as well as Hungary and East Germany, 
Gorbachev's words can not be dismissed as rhetoric aimed solely at 
Western public opiniou. Clearly he stands committed to Eastern European 
reform and the expansion of political and economic opportunities 
previously closed to large sectors of communist ruled populations.
By examining Soviet statements over time it is clear that Kremlin 
policy with regard to Eastern Europe has continued to evolve throughout 
the decade. As Bloc nations challenge Soviet foreign policy by exerting 
greater sovereignty, they systematically pursue and destroy previously 
understood limitations. It is not enough to say that Gorbachev does not 
subscribe to the Breznhev Doctrine. One must search Gorbachev's policies 
for definitions and possible limitations regarding reform. Through 
examination of his statements and actions, as well as those of other 
government and media officials, it is clear that Gorbachev's intra-Bloc 
policy has been defined as much by the East European challenges of reform 
as by Kremlin decision makers.
In addition to the Polish and Hungarian events during the summer of 
1989, the Chinese Communist's crackdown in Tiananmen Square in early
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June may have contributed to Gorbachev's strong statements in Strasbourg. 
He took the opportunity to further distance himself and his country from 
Soviet totalitarian history. At a time when world opinion was strongly 
critical of the Chinese events, Gorbachev was able to stand on the side of 
freedom, unified, at least on the Chinese issue, with the Western leaders.
Finally, it must be noted that the Soviet Union can not afford any 
increase, or even a continuance of the economic dependency into which 
Eastern Europe has fallen. Due to the dismal state of the Soviet economy, 
Moscow has become unwilling and unable to support prices, funnel 
economic aid, or pay for a large military presence throughout the Bloc. 
Statements such as those in Strasbourg serve to reassure the West of 
Moscow's commitment to reform, thus enhancing the possibility of needed 
economic assistance from the West.
Gorbachev's rhetoric changed over time in several significant ways. 
Prior to the reforms in Poland and Hungary, Mr. Gorbachev was quick to 
assert that all Bloc reforms would be conducted under the auspices of each 
nation's respective communist party. For example, in a 1986 speech to 
workers in Budapest the Soviet leader stated that economic reforms could 
only be judged successful in terms of their "strengthening of socialism in 
all areas, political, economic, spiritual."3 This was interpreted as a clear 
warning that movement toward a free market economy should only be 
conducted under the control of the Party-state structures.
In Poland within weeks of the Budapest remarks, Gorbachev praised 
Jaruzelski's crackdown of December, 1981, asserting that strong action had 
given the Polish people a victory in the "struggle for the very existence of
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socialism in Poland."4 East European scholar Hdlfene Carrtre D'encausse 
stated that, by the time these remarks were made (June 1986), Moscow 
considered the Solidarity phenomenon as one rellogated to Polish history.3 
The movement was considered simply a product of Poland's long history of 
periodic unrest. Thus, as was apparent in governmental and media 
statements, the Kremlin leadership awarded nearly unqualified support to 
Jaruzelski and the PUWP. However, speaking at a 1989 meeting with 
Alfred Miodowicz, Chairman of Poland's official trade unions, Gorbachev 
made it clear that he favored expanding contacts with all party, union, and 
popular organizations within Poland.2 This sharply contrasted with the 
traditional policy of maintaining contacts with only the Party and the Party 
controlled state in Eastern European countries. With the PUWP's loss of 
complete governmental control, the Soviets were forced to establish 
channels of international relations with non-communist political actors in 
Poland.
Within a year of Gorbachev's praise of Jaruzelski, it became clear that 
Solidarity had not been eliminated. Polish dissident Jacek Kuron, KOR 
member and advisor to Solidarity, coined the phrase "self-limiting 
revolution" to describe Solidarity's activism and demands.6 In 1981 
Solidarity refused to accept limitations imposed by the Kremlin leadership. 
With the advent of the late 1980s both the external restrictions and 
Solidarity's organizational structure had changed. Thus a more cautious, 
experienced, and well advised movement emerged from years in the 
underground into an international atmosphere more tolerant of dissent, 
reform, and change.
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Finally, the Her half of the 1980s witnessed a much greater 
emphasis on the issue of a united Europe. As Western Europe grew 
increasingly integrated, the East appeared more isolated and behind its 
Western counterpart. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the voices of 
Western European countries took on a more independent tone regarding 
NATO and World affairs. NATO, although remaining US dominated in many 
respects, came to represent an alliance of politically divergent and 
sovereign powers. Here too the East lagged behind. Increased Western 
European ties further instilled the feeling among Eastern Europeans that, 
culturally, it is the West, not the East, to which they can relate. As 
Gorbachev released restrictions on Bloc countries encouraging them to 
pursue more sovereign foreign and domestic policies, it was to the West 
that they turned. Even Mr. Gorbachev spoke of "a common European 
home" in which the continent would no longer be grossly divided and 
pitted against itself.7 He further stated, "Europe's historic chance lies in 
peaceful cooperation between the states of that continent."8 He called for 
dramatically increased contacts and ties that would transform the 
dynamics of East-West relations by incorporating all of Europe's states 
rather than limiting significant dialogue to superpower dominated 
alliances.
Clearly Gorbachev desired both political and economic change in 
Eastern Europe. Questions remain, however, as to the depth and pace of 
these permitted transformations. In addition, there exists a concern that 
the region's volatility could threaten reform by lending an uncontrolled 
quality to the changes. The Soviets retain a large stake in the
developments throughout Eastern Europe. They have important motives 
for encouraging reform as well as great risks in its eventual course.
If Eastern Europe can be characterized as volatile, the Soviet 
republics can be said to be explosive. Violence has been constant in some 
Soviet republics since 1987 and it shows no »igns of abating. The danger 
for the Kremlin lies in popular understanding of the distinction between 
the expanding sovereignty of Eastern European nations and the limited 
autonomy of Soviet Republics. Gorbachev has shown no signs that he is 
willing to relinquish the Baltic Republics to form their own independent 
states. Furthermore, ethnic and worker violence in the central and 
southern republics could be ignited by the political and economic gains of 
their East European "socialist brothers." If only by example, popular 
dissent and mass participation movements in other Bloc nations could 
encourage fledgling opposition organizations within the USSR. Thus there 
exists some incompatibility of policy among Bloc countries. What is good 
for Eastern Europe may not be good for the USSR, and vice-versa. As the 
events of 1989 have demonstrated, reform and liberalization have the 
potential to spread at an inconceivable pace. Gorbachev must maintain 
constant vigilance and control if he is to continue to determine the course 
of Soviet politics and economics.
One of the original impetus for Bloc economic reform, aside from the 
Soviet's inability to maintain tfed present cost of the dependency 
relationship, was the idea that economic growth and recovery would bring 
greater economic integration. It was thought that the economic whole 
would be greater than the sum of its parts. In addition, increased
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economic integration would produce a greater Soviet ability to determine 
Bloc policy. As late as 1987 and early 1988, Bloc economic integration 
remained an important goal within Soviet foreign policy and economic 
circles.9 With the advent of substantive economic reform and a growing 
trend toward free market systems in some Bast European countries, it 
became apparent that this could never be achieved through the CMEA. In 
fact, at a summit of Warsaw Pact nations in the summer of 1989, Soviet 
Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhor expressed a complete lack of faith in the 
CMEA's ability to build or maintain constructive economic growth and 
integration.10 Following this summit it was clear to all Pact members that 
neither the organization's structures nor its practices could be of service to 
economic markets dictated by the forces of supply and demand.
The Soviets are only too aware that risks of economic openness and 
reform can produce situations in which control has been lost to reform 
momentum. Conversely the East European leaders can no longer hide 
behind Soviet control in order to avoid domestic economic and political 
responsibility. Moscow has called on other Bloc nations to forge their own 
culturally and societally based paths to prosperity. As Mr. Ligachev stated 
in Budapest, "every country must follow its own road . . .  If it was once 
possible to think that the conductor of this orchestra was to be found in 
Moscow, that is no longer true."11
Michael Mandelbaum, East European specialist at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, made the following comments regarding Soviet impetus 
for reform and liberalization within the Bloc:
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We (the West) must keep in mind, though, that the Soviets have not 
come to such and understanding for our sake. It is the least worst 
option for them, because the cost • both to their own reform 
programs and physically - of keeping Poland and Hungary in line are 
too great.12
Interestingly, given the events of September - November of 1989, 
Mandelbaum assets that East Germany will prove to be the true test of 
Soviet liberalization.13 As of this writing, the Democratic German Republic 
now finds itself in the midst of rapid political change and growing 
involvement with its Western brother the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have repeatedly warned that any 
discussion of German reunification would prove premature and 
destabilizing.
Gorbachev's address to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU demonstrates the Soviet inability to continue financial support 
of East European economies or the cost of greater involvement and 
intervention. He stated that not only had the recent rates of Soviet 
economic decline reached "a critical poin." but, in actuality, the economy of 
the USSR had not grown at all for over two decades.14 The Soviet leader 
pointed out that, minus the inflated world price for Soviet oil exports and 
the growth of retail alcohol sales, the national income of the USSR had 
ceased to grow over twenty years ago.19 Valerie Bunce quotes a figure of 
$133 billion in Soviet assistance to Eastern Europe between 1971-1981 
which does not include the bill for the large Soviet military presence in the
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region.16 The cost of periodic re-enforcing conformity must also be 
considered. The combination of the above factors help to explain Soviet 
economic stagnation and failing growth rate.
The Soviets realiie that Pact countries must gain Western assistance 
if Bloc reforms are to be achieved without widespread unrest. This 
assistance will not be limited to loans and grants, but may include Western 
private investment and fiscal and economic advice as well as favorable 
trade legislation. Political patience and cooperation between Eastern and 
Western governments will be necessary if this assistance is to be coherent 
and consistent. Increased East-West trade will play a significant role in 
any progress toward Bloc economic recovery.
The spirit of increased cooperation was expressed in the 13 June 
1989 joint Soviet-West German Political Declaration. The main thrust of 
the document, as reported by Barbara Donovan of Radio Liberty, was to 
present a "common view of Europe's future" that could emerge from 
"concessions and compromises.”17 The West German catch phrase 
equivalent to Gorbachev's "common European house” used in the joint 
declaration was "a European peace structure."1* The West German idea 
carries with it the implication that the United States and Canada would also 
play a part of this "peace structure." The document stated that it is "a 
matter of the highest priority to try to overcome the division of Europe” 
and based the "peace structure" on the following criteria:
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. . . absolute respect for the integrity and security of each state . . . .  
the right (of each state) to choose freely its own political and social 
system . . . .  and respect for a people's right to self-determination.19
The joint declaration did not address the issue of reunification or 
specific policy elements concerning Soviet-Bast European relations. The 
document gave no hint of the extent to which Bloc nations may stray from 
the Soviet model or control. Often in the history of Soviet signatures on 
East-West documents the statements agreed to on paper have had little or 
no effect on intra-Bloc relations in practice. However, the liberalization 
now underway within various Eastern European nations illustrate that 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy may be in line with the statements and joint 
agreements he endorsed.
Political developments in Poland and Hungary demonstrate 
Gorbachev's readiness to allow development of multi-party democratic 
systems. In addition, both countries have embarked on plans to 
deconstruct many Soviet style economic structures in favor of a free 
market approach. At the very least it can be said that, in contrast to the 
Brezhnev era, these reforms have not produced Soviet military 
intervention or forced crackdowns. As Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Gennadii Gerasimov stated on Hungarian television, the path chosen by 
each Bloc nation "is in its own hands."20 He attempted to clarify the future 
Soviet role in the domestic affairs of Pact nations by saying, "we can give 
advice, we can discuss issues, but the right to decide is not ours."21 Thus it
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appears that the Eastern Europeans will not be obstructed as they abandon 
established definitions of communism.
There has been a great deal of speculation as to the limits of Soviet 
toleration for sovereignty and independence within the Bloc. Many assert 
that the Pact nations may act unhindered by Moscow as long as they do 
not attempt to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. However, Soviet reaction 
to such a move by one of the Bloc members would be situational. The 
Kremlin's reaction would be affected by factors such as NATO's posture 
toward the withdrawal, the withdrawing nation's future plans, and a 
myriad of other domestic and international elements. In other words, just 
as Gorbachev's policies toward Eastern Europe have become at least 
partially determined by the challenges presented by nations such as 
Poland, so to will future policies and action be greatly affected by 
situational elements, During the days of the Brezhnev Doctrine a great 
many policy options, if taken, could and did provoke Soviet intervention. 
Present day Soviet-Eastern European relations operate in an arena of 
fewer restrictions and greater uncertainty. This is in stark contrast to the 
era of limitations and threats which emerged from statements designed to 
retain Soviet dominance throughout the region.
Gorbachev introduced ideas concerning the transformation of the 
Warsaw Pact into something other than a militarily dominated 
organization.22 He wants to encourage the growth of political, cultural, 
social, an economic ties among the Bloc societies. If a new organization is 
needed to fill the gap left by the CMEA's inadequacies, Bloc countries may 
begin the search for new forms of economic integration.
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Despite both political and economic evidence that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine is no longer in use and Soviet attempts at regional hegemony have 
Come to an end, many questions remain unresolved. Vladimir Kusin, for 
example, contends that Gorbachev must repudiate the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in order to convincingly denounce the Brezhnev Doctrine.23 
Since the leadership installed by the Soviets following the invasion has 
been replaced, the chances of a public re-examination of the military 
intervention may have increased. A denunciation of the Hungarian 
invasion appears less likely, however. The Hungarian reformists of 19S6 
professed their intention to leave the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, a 
repudiation of this invasion would leave open the door to Pact withdrawal. 
Mr. Gorbachev's domestic existence is too tenuous and problem-ridden to 
take such a risk. As stated previously, the Kremlin appears quite willing to 
simply relate to its allies on a situational basis allowing them to select their 
own paths and challenge traditional taboos.
7
The Backlash of Reform
Liberalization and reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has 
allowed for the emergence of long-standing grievances and injustices 
Consequently, both in Eastern Europe and the USSR the historical bill 
coming due for atrocities and injustices committed by p u t Soviet re >. 
Stalin's legacy has been especially damaging to the Soviets' reputatioi 
throughout the Bloc. Poland serves u  an excellent illustration of the
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Soviet backlash produced by the greater openness of both Polish and 
Soviet societies. Through a continuing dialogue, many historical grievances 
are being re-examined and exposed in order to allow a societal healing 
process to begin. For decades, the Soviets refused to accept responsibility 
for past actions or to propose farms of compensation. The refusal to 
acknowledge injustices may have contributed to the legitimacy problems 
of Bast European communism because it appears to the region's citizens to 
be yet another example of Soviet hegemony.1 In Poland, for example, the 
post-war communist government consisted of Poles who had spent the war 
in exile and training in the USSR, rather than Poles who remained to fight 
the Nazi occupation.
Much of the modem anti-Soviet sentiment in Polish society stems 
from Stalinist policies and atrocities surrounding World War II. The so 
called Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of August 1939 is a 
frequently cited symbol of Soviet disregard for the sovereignty of Central 
Europe. Secret protocols attached to the document separated the region 
into spheres of influence and control for Germany and the USSR. The 
agreement led to the Soviet occupation of Polish territory following Hitler's 
invasion of western Poland.
The Soviets under Mr. Gorbachev have, for the first time, 
acknowledged the existence of these protocols and their establishment of 
spheres of influence. However, official government statements stopped 
short of calling the Pact a mistake or an injustice.2 Scholars such as Dmitrii 
Volkogonov, the head of the Institute of Military History at the USSR 
Ministry of Defense, stated that research and analysis dictate that the
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Hitler-Stalin pact was "a great political mistake."3 Despite the injustice of 
the pact, the Soviets continue to claim that Red Army invasions and 
annexations in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, were desired by the 
indigenous peoples and necessary given the situation of the time.
World War II issues place the Soviet government in a difficult 
position between Eastern European concerns and domestic affairs. It is 
difficult for the Soviets to approach condemnation of the Pact and the 
subsequent invasion given that the Baltic states were annexed into the 
Soviet Union as a result of these events. Since the Baltic republics have 
been pushing for greater independence, denouncing the invasion could 
further destabilize the situation. Calls for a re-examination of the invasion 
are growing within the Soviet Union, however. M. I. Semryaga of the 
Institute of the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences condemned the Red Army takeover of Eastern Poland; thus adding 
the support of an official government organization representing socialist 
workers.3
On 17 September 1989, the Polish Government and the PUWP joined 
the growing list of voices criticizing the Soviet invasion. The Polish 
communist party newspaper, Trybuna Luda. referred to the pact and the 
PUWP’s condemnation of it as breaching one of "the most secret taboo 
subjects."4 If the PUWP is to gain credibility among the Polish citizenry it 
must continue to distance itself from the Soviet Union by establishing 
independence from Kremlin domination. Thus, the future is likely to bring 
increased denunciation and opposition to policies and statements 
originating in Moscow.
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A joint Soviet and Polish historical commission was established to 
examine and fill in the "blank spots" in the two countries1 relations.5 These 
"blank spots" include such events as the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, 
the origins of World War II, the Katyn massacre, the Warsaw uprising of 
1944, and the mass deportation of Poles following the Red Army invasion. 
To date the commission has produced few results. It seems that there are 
an insufficient number of reformers to advance research and publication of 
results.5 Consequently, evidence and opinions emerging from the 
commission have been published only in Poland. Some of this material 
was produced by more liberal members of the Soviet team who were 
refused publication in their country.7 As a result, reports of wide ranging 
disagreement between the Polish and Soviet delegations have surfaced. 
Clearly this inhibits any reconciliation of these historical conflicts within 
the consciousness of the Polish people.
Poles have moved forward with the publication of sensitive materials 
without the permission of the joint commission, thereby demonstrating the 
challenge Polish reform presents to Soviet policy. As Poles move forward 
with reforms which are deeper and more radical than those of Mr. 
Gorbachev, implicit pressure is placed on Kremlin leaders. Again, Polish 
changes serve as innovative examples of the extent to which reform may 
progress. Furthermore, Gorbachev has styled himself to be the leader and 
voice of Bloc reform, yet in Poland and other Pact nations his changes and 
plans are outstripped on a daily basis.
These historical and cultural issues are, by nature, difficult to 
measure as to their actual level of importance. However, given their
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extensive press coverage and the fact that these issues have survived over 
forty years of repression, it can at least be said that they are significant in 
their ability to shape overall public perceptions. These issues effect the 
view of Soviet control and the affiliation of the domestic Party with the 
Kremlin. Even as Polish television under the Solidarity government 
documents Stalinist atrocities following the 1939 Red Army invasion, the 
Soviets further damage the communist reputation by continuing to spout 
the same rehearsed answers to growing accusations.* For example,
Moscow continues to blame Western appeasement of Nazi Germany for 
advent of World War II and still dismisses charges that the Red Army 
perpetrated the Katyn massacre of thousands of Polish officers.
Soviet patriotism regarding their own resistance to the Nazis is 
immense and widely displayed. Soviet recognition of the 200,000 Poles 
who died in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising against Nazi occupation is almost 
nonexistent. Even as the Nazi's struggled to crush the uprising, the Red 
Army waited within sight of Warsaw rather than aid the resisting Poles. 
They refused to act, say many Poles, because the uprising was not led by 
communists. The Red Army desired to install a communist government in 
Poland which could be dependent and sympathetic to Moscow's commands. 
Given the destruction wrought by both German and Soviet forces, the 
affect of these issues on the citizenry's consciousness can not be dismissed.
As reformists grow in number and power throughout Eastern Europe, 
the possibility exists that they will discover their common bond as 
members of the historically repressed. Signs of this phenomenon have 
already begun as Poland and Hungary express mutual support for each
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country's respective reforms. In addition, both countries have attempted 
to encourage reformists in hard-line nations. The Hungarian decision to 
open its borders to the West and the subsequent allowance of mass Bast 
German emigration into the West via Hungary, placed intolerable levels of 
domestic pressure on the G.D.R. government. Poland also allowed all East 
Germans seeking refuge in West German facilities within Poland to 
emigrate. The two countries acted in accordance with their reformist 
ideals by criticizing the Soviets as well. Both Poland and Hungary publicly 
and officially condemned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. In addition, 
they called on the Soviets to do the same. It is only a matter of time until 
East European reformers vocalize opposition to current Soviet policies or 
actions.
The danger of a reform backlash within the USSR also exists. The 
combination of Soviet volatility and complete media coverage of rapid and 
radical reforms in Eastern Europe increases the possibility of unrest with 
the USSR itself. For example, the widespread Soviet coal miners strike of 
1989 required direct intervention and concession by Mr. Gorbachev in 
order to reach a settlement. Furthermore, strike leaders have begun 
attempts to break away from the communist controlled All-Union Council 
of Trade Unions to establish the USSR's first independent trade union.9 The 
events in Eastern Europe cannot help but encourage such activity.
The striking coal miners were quick to reject Solidarity-type roles 
which take on broad social, political, and national issues. To illustrate this 
point strike leader Yuri A. Boldyrev said of the strike movements, "We are 
demonstrating our loyalty (to the state) . . .  We insist on all our demands
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being met, but we represent a force with well defined boundaries."10 
Nevertheless, some political demands were put forth. This type of large 
scale strike activity coupled with demands for independent trade unions 
can only create anxiety within the Kremlin. Thus, on a grass roots level, 
radical reform in Eastern Europe presents challenges to the Soviet 
leadership through the precedents it sets. The newly forged party-state- 
populous relationships may serve as possible models for Soviet workers to 
pursue.
Soviet independence movements have also been encouraged by the 
decrease in Soviet dominance over its Bloc allies. Independence activists 
have received overwhelming popular support in the Baltic Republics. In 
addition they appear to be slowly gaining in strength in the Ukraine. Mr. 
Gorbachev has repeatedly warned these movements as to their limitations; 
however, the issues they articulate continue to grow in popularity.
Evidence that the "Polish disease" may be spreading appears to be 
mounting. Throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR Polish reformers have 
actively supported independence movements. For example, well known 
Solidarity activist nnd new member of the Polish Parliament, Adam 
Michnik yelled the slogan "Long live the free, just Ukraine" at a September 
1989 rally in Kiev.11 Such overt displays of unity between East European 
and Soviet opposition movements fuel the fire of Soviet hard-liners in 
their arguments against reform.
Kremlin condemnation of Baltic independence movements has been 
especially threatening in light of their tremendous popular support. 
Gorbachev accused them of creating hysteria and the prospect of "civil
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conflict" through the use of the "virus of nationalism."12 Both the 
Lithuanian and Estonian legislatures voted to declare their annexation by 
the Soviets as one accomplished by force; thus, invalidating it. This move 
stops just short of attempting to secede and declaring full independence. 
Gorbachev must strive to avoid any further spill-over of East European 
reform influence into these republics.
It is clear then, whether in Eastern European nations or within the 
Soviet Union itself, there exists a danger that reform nay backfire and 
produce anti-Sovietism. This risk affects all governmental and popular 
levels of society. These dangers present unique challenges to Soviet policy 
makers. Even as developments in Poland and elsewhere in the region push 
for ever-increasing national sovereignty. Kremlin leaders must walk the 
line between pressures which stem from their stated policy on Bloc 
relations, and the awareness that external forces could ignite tensions 
within the USSR. Now the Soviets must worry about the effects of outside 
pressures on domestic affairs, as well. Ironically it is Eastern Europe which 
presents this new challenge to Soviet policy makers.
8
Bloc Relations: Where To Go From Here?
Poland is by no means the only country in Eastern Europe to 
experience radical reform. The entire region has been affected. Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are rapidly transforming many political 
and social institutions into more open and accessible structures. In
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Bulgaria, long a model of Soviet-style party-state bureaucracy, reformers 
are ascending to positions of power and pushing out the older hard-line 
generation. As developments in Bloc countries occur at a striking pace, the 
entire world, including the Soviets, scramble to keep track of the changes. 
The reforms in Eastern Europe transform the very foundations of East- 
West relations. So too are they transforming the nature of Soviet foreign 
policy and its formulation. As the Kremlin relinquishes its powers over 
Communist parties and states in the region, Soviet intra-bloc relations 
begin to work on a reactive basis. No more will Moscow attempt to dictate 
foreign and domestic policy to its allies. Today, the Soviets, as the rest of 
the international community, must determine foreign policy on a 
continually changing basis. Rather than determined by Moscow's agenda, 
the Kremlin's actions with regard to Bloc nations will now emerge as a 
result of a combination of Soviet goals and the actions and statements of 
other sovereign nations within the Pact.
Hungarian communists have led the country to the brink of multi­
party democracy. Elections have been scheduled and opposition groups 
approved. Member of the four man presidium which governs Hungary, 
Rezso Nyers, stated that his country must rid itself of "the dead hand of 
statism," adding that the Party must be "willing to nit (its) case before the 
people in an election."1 In September of 1989, U.S. campaign officials 
conducted a seminar in Hungary for opposition parties. Clearly the taboo 
of Western political influence and "bourgeois democracy" hns been cast 
aside.
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Although not tied to or controlled by the Soviets ai the Pact countries 
were, Yugoslavia also offers an example of the growing liberalization. 
Members of the Party leadership are calling for a new constitution which 
dees not dictate the Party's leading role in society.2 This as they prepare 
for May, 1990 elections in which non-communist groups will compete. The 
Party's leading role may be relinquished in reformist Bloc nations as well. 
The East German transformation has been staggering. Following a mass 
exodus of almost 200,000 East Germans to West Germany via other Bloc 
countries and the almost non-existent Soviet public response to it, the GDR 
replaced its hard-line leadership and invited opposition figures into 
cabinet posts.
The scope of Bloc reform widens on a daily basis. With every 
additional step away from the party-state model, the region becomes more 
susceptible to Western influence and increased involvement. As Izvestia 
commentator Aleksander Bovin stated, "not only security is at stake, but 
ideology, as well."3 Thus the Soviets have abandoned much more than 
their traditional view of Bloc control as indicative of security. They have 
released Eastern Europeans to pursue their own socialist models, as well.
No longer does the Soviet system and the CPSU stand as the one model for 
socialist development. The Kremlin can not point to Bloc nations as 
evidence of the unalterable spread of Soviet-style communism.
Consequently, the West is gaining opportunities for involvement in 
the Bloc. Eosterr European nations thus become more susceptible to 
Western influences. Aside from political support of democracy and 
electoral rights, economic issues open up Pact societies to the West, as well.
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As Bloc governments look for aid, advice, and trade from the West, 
economic ties develop on all levels. In addition, as the debt to the West 
grows, entanglement with Western governments and institutions increases 
as well. The introduction of democratic practices and free market forces 
transforms East European societies making them more difficult to 
externally control because public opinion and consumer demand, not 
unrestrained political power, determine many elements of political and 
economic policy.
The importance of Eastern Europe on the international scene must 
not be underestimated. The region has become an increasingly important 
element of U.S.-Soviet relations. Although recent reforms were 
accompanied by superpower cooperation, history has demonstrated that 
East-West relations can quickly change. Eastern Europe is no longer 
viewed as hopelessly within Soviet control or as a symbol of the cold war. 
Thus the region should assume its rightful importance in American and 
West European foreign policy. President Bush has been extremely cautious 
in his approach to recent developments. He does not want to over-involve 
America in Bloc countries, thereby increasing Soviet anxiety. Nevertheless, 
East European issues were deemed important enough to prompt a Bush- 
Qorbachev summit in early December, 1989. This caution reflects the 
volatility within the region, Gorbachev's precarious position atop the CPSU, 
and the significance of the remaining Soviet involvement in Eastern 
Europe.
The dynamics of East-West relations have begun to show signs of 
transformation. For example, the visit by President Bush to both Poland
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and Hungary prior to a formal summit with Mr. Gorbachev is highly 
unusual.4 In the past, Western leaders, especially the American President, 
were expected to meet the Soviet leader prior to visiting other Bloc 
countries.
Hungarian intellectual George Konrdd spoke of the growing 
independence and importance of Eastern European nations as follows:
(a) gradual, controlled transformation of the Soviet Bloc into a looser 
community of nations capable of interacting with Western Europe on 
a partnership basis.5
Clearly, this description of a new East-West relations structure increases 
contacts and ties. Consequently, just as the American government must 
consider and attempt to anticipate the reaction of its allies to a given action 
or policy statement, so too the Soviets will be forced to take Bloc member 
response into account. This additional accountability will affect policy in a 
way that the Kremlin has yet to experience. As in the NATO alliance, the 
Warsaw Pact may develop into an organization without an absolute leader 
in all policy areas.
Vladimir Kusin asserts that Gorbachev may have underestimated the 
force with which reform would take hold, assuming that, as liberalization 
was carried out, the advantages of remaining within the Bloc would be 
self-evident.6 He further suggests that the Kremlin may have been lulled 
into unawares regarding bloc countries as a result of the relatively 
uneventful nature of Gorbachev's first two years in office.7 It appears that
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Gorbachev's leadership was struck by the rapid and far reaching reforms 
of Poland. They seem to have put him on the defensive by forcing the 
Kremlin to react to East European developments, rather than attempt to 
determine them. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's reaction has licensed these 
reforms by allowing them to continue uninhibited by Kremlin intervention.
The vast differences in Soviet posturing toward Eastern Europe are 
striking as the 1980-1981 period is compared and contrasted with 1987- 
1989. Poland, because of its repeated challenges to both Soviet dominance 
and Soviet-style reform, has been a barometer for Soviet-East Bloc 
relations. The Kremlin attempted to create in Eastern Europe, communist 
systems in the image of the USSR. As Polish and other Bloc reforms 
surpass those of the Soviets, this too must change. Gorbachev and other 
Soviet officials have stated that they would lode to Eastern Europe for 
successful reform models and policies. Parastroika and glasnost have 
begun the acknowledgement of Soviet-East European common problems, 
the acceptance of societal differences, and the search for individual as well 
as intra-bloc resolutions.
To construct generalized formulas or predictions for all of Eastern 
Europe on the basis of the Polish experience would be a gross error. Due to 
their significant situational and cultural differences, one model, as the 
attempted Soviet hegemony proved, will not suffice for Bloc development. 
Unique phenomenon such as the power of the Polish Catholic Church, a 
recent history of independent trade unionism, and a disastrous economic 
crisis distinguish the Polish social, political, and economic environment 
from that of its East European allies. What can be drawn from the Polish
7 9
events of the 1980s is the nature of the relationship between Moscow and 
the Bloc countries. The leadership of Eastern Europe can be expected to 
continue on paths toward reform and sovereignty. As a result, Soviet allies 
will assume a growing importance in the formulation of Kremlin foreign 
policy. No longer will all Pact members mechanically fall into step behind 
Moscow.
As structural transformation continues, the ability to return to the 
prior relationship grows more distant. The underlying fear that Soviet 
domestic problems or unforeseen events might cause a change in the 
Kremlin leadership rnay help drive the rate of reform momentum. Bloc 
countries want to construct and stabilize their new structures to insulate 
them from future Soviet interference. Mass movements fueled change in 
Poland as well as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In other 
words, huge segments of the population are gaining a voice in their 
countries' domestic and foreign policy formulation. Economic crisis or 
success may determine the level of political reforms to be carried out. 
Nevertheless, it can be said that the decade of the 1980s witnessed the 
emergence of Eastern European nations onto the international scene. The 
challenges presented by Polish unrert, opposition, and reform greatly 
contributed to this transformation. Soviet-East European relations have 
evolved away from Soviet dominance into an atmosphere of transition 
toward a more balanced relationship.
2 July-14 August 
1-2 August 
15 August
20 August
26 August 
28 August 
31 August
1 September
2 September
8 0
Appendix 1
Chronology
July 1980 • December 1981
1980
Polish workers went on strike to protest increased 
meat prices.
Communique of Brezhnev-Gierek meeting in Crimea 
ignored the Polish strikes.
TASS announced Warsaw Pact maneuvers in the 
Baltic region and G.D.R. Soviet reservists weie called 
up during the month.
Pravda summary of a Gierek speech broke Soviet 
media silence on Polish labor unrest and stressed 
the resolve of Polish rulers.
Gierek's self-criticism omitted from Pravda version 
of his speech on Polish TV.
Soviet media reported Polish Government • labor 
talks on Baltic coast.
Gus Hall in Pravda blamed Polish strikes on 
leadership "weaknesses."
Pravda article by "A. Petrov" tacitly criticized the 
Gdansk accords.
Lech Walesa assailed by Moscow TV as "one of the 
members of an opposition group."
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6 September
8 September 
8 September
10-11 September
18 September 
20 September
23 September
25 September
27 September
7 October
19 October
Pravda rejected use of "fist in •  dispute over 
principle," urged "caution and prudence . . . ability 
to . . . keep cool in the most critical situation."
40,000 Warsaw Pact troops began 4-day 
maneuvers in the O.D.R.
Kania inaugural in Pravda omitted his criticism of 
Fuehrerprinzip. Also toned down was his readiness 
for political debate and reform.
Polish Politburo member and Deputy Premier 
Jagielski visited Moscow, met Suslov and Brezhnev. 
Soviet economic aid committed to Poland.
Western intelligence reportedly detected signs of 
unusual military activity in the O.D.R. and USSR.
"A. Petrov" in Pravda warned that anticommunist 
subversion would increase in Poland as the 
situation there became more stable.
Radio Free Europe was sending orders to 
antisocialist elements in Poland, according to V. 
Bolshakov in Pravda.
Lenin's attack on advocates of free trade unions 
under socialism was stressed by Prof. O. Alekseyev 
in Pravda.
"A. Petrov" of Pravda saw a division of "patriots" 
and "enemies" among Poles.
Pravda version of Kania's report to the Polish 
Central Committee detailed internal failings like 
those in USSR but muted the reformist policy 
proposals.
Romanian Pa.ty head Ceausescu's confidence in the 
PUWP reported by Pravda.
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21 October Brezhnev addressed the CPSU Central Committee 
Plenum. A full text was not released and the 
summary ignored Poland.
30 October TASS Statement on Soviet-Polish summit in 
Kremlin. Brezhnev voiced confidence in Poles and 
Kania joined him in attack on Western meddling.
3, 21, 23, November Oen. Moczar, Polish symbol of law and order, given 
favorable publicity in Pravda.
6 November Soviet Premier Tikhonov disregarded Poland in his 
leadership report for Bolshevik Revolution day.
7 November Kania was disdainfully referred to as Party "first" 
rather than "First" secretary in Pravda.
10 November Joint Soviet-Polish army maneuvers noted by 
Pravda as Solidarity deadline of November 12 for 
general strike approaches. Signs of high-level 
meetings at Soviet Embassy in Warsaw, probably 
over Solidarity legalization dispute.
19 November Pravda reported that PUWP meetings were calling 
for "urgent measures" to ensure the "full 
restoration" of the Party's "leading role and 
authority."
21 November CPSU Politburo member and Secretary Chernenko 
attacked "capitulationists" and quoted Lenin against 
free trade unions under socialism, in Kommunist 
article.
24 November TASS warned that a general strike on Polish 
railways could disrupt land communications 
through Poland.
26 November Solidarity's theft of official secrets hinted in muted 
Pravda account of the union's demand for curbing
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the State security service, Another item hit at the 
Polish Government for neglecting pro-regime 
unions.
28 November Pravda cited Polish war veterans' demand for "a 
halt to anarchy." In the paper's theory article, a 
"timely response" was urged to actions of "anti­
socialist forces."
28 November Dissident leac' r Kuron in Warsaw warned strikers 
of the danger of Soviet military intervention.
30 November Pravda softened a Czechoslovak press commentary 
on Poland.
1 -3 December Soviet troop activity in western military districts 
was reportedly stepped up rnd some reserves 
mobilized.
1 December Warsaw Radio announced a Soviet promise of $1.3 
billion aid package.
2 December Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei flew to Moscow 
for an unscheduled meeting with Brezhnev.
3 December Pravda summarized at length Kania's report to the 
Polish Central Committee. The tough passages were 
reprinted and innovative ones bowdlerized.
5 December Warsaw Pact emergency summit in Moscow. 
Statement hinted that Polish leaders should be 
given more time to reassert their authority.
3 December Alarmist lines in the Polish Central Committee's 
appeal to the nation were not in the Pravda version. 
But a "grave threat" to internal stability was 
claimed in the communique of the Polish Defense 
Ministry's Military Council, also cited in Pravda.
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5-7 December White House vigil on Poland after intelligence 
reports warned of impending Soviet armed 
intervention in Poland.
8 December Moscow Radio broadcast a TASS cable from Warsaw 
stating that Solidarity had begun to move against 
Party and management officials. The Soviet press 
did not run this item, later denied by Polish officials 
and Solidarity sources.
10 December Soviet Politburo member and Defense Minister 
Ustinov told military Communists that reactionaries 
were trying to hurt Poland.
12 December Pravda's brief text of a CPSU Politburo resolution on 
results of the 5 December Warsaw Pact summit 
lacked a "political evaluation," suggesting leadership 
dissension.
18 December "A. Petrov" told Pravda readers that NATO was 
eager to iaunch military intervention in Poland.
18 and 28 December Kommunist and Pravda commentaries on Poland 
diverged on whether the social conflicts there were 
both "antagonistic and nonantagonistic," that is, if 
regime-Solidarity clash was inexorable.
19 December Fidel Castro cited by Pravda on the 'explosively 
dangerous situation around Poland" and need to 
avoid "concessions" to "the class enemy."
26 December Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek visited Moscow and 
met with Brezhnev, who voiced confidence in the 
PUWP.
26 December Pravda theory article on trade unions held that 
strikes in Poland benefited antisocialist elements.
30 December Pravda and Izvestiva's weekly magazine NfidfilyJL 
differed on the socio-political climate in Poland.
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9 January 
13 January
13*20 January 
29 January
7 February 
8, 10 February
11 February
12 February 
17 February 
23 February
1981
Gromyko in the CPSU journal Kommuniat seconded 
Brezhnev's confidence*in*Poland line.
Marshal Kulikov was received by Kania and 
Premier Pinkowski. Gen. Jaruzelsld took part in the 
talks.
Zamyatin-led delegation visited Poland and 
discussed Party control of media.
Pravda neutrally cited the French President on the 
wisdom of non-intervention by all powers vis-k-vis 
Poland.
Solidarity was instigating anti-Party violence and 
harassment, according to Pravda.
U.S. intelligence sources said Soviet troops alerted 
for crisis in December (26 divisions) remained in a 
high state of readiness on Poland's border.
Oktyabr ran an article by old ideologue Bugayev 
linking Polish events with those in Hungary 1956 
and Czechoslovakia 1968.
Pravda Ukrainv reported a harsh indirect criticism 
of Solidarity at the Ukraine Party Congress.
New Polish Premier Gen. Jaruzelski met with 
Warsaw Pact ambassadors to Poland.
Brezhnev Report at 26th CPSU Congress ignored 
Kania's "line of agreement" formula and vowed 
support of the weakened Polish regime.
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24 February Kania reassured the Soviet Party Congress that 
Polish leaders had both patience and resolve.
February Soviet Army divisions along the Polish borders 
were reportedly put on a much lower state of alert.
4 March Soviet-Polish summit held in Moscow. PUWP was 
to "turn the course of events" and the doctrine of 1 
limited sovereignty was reaffirmed.
8, 13, 14 March Pravda hit at Solidarity for creating armed bands, 
sheltering renegades, taking C.I.A. funds, and 
backing the legal defense of right-wing dissident 
Mosczulski.
9 March Soviet trade union chairman Shibayev stated in 
Kommunist that trade unions under socialism must 
recognize the Communist Party’s leading role.
11 March Warsaw Pact command-staff exercise in Poland and 
elsewhere scheduled for second half of March, 
Pravda announced.
19 March PAP reported Warsaw Pact "Soyuz-81" maneuvers 
in Poland, C.D.R., USSR and Czechoslovakia.
20 March One day after Polish police attacked protestors in 
Bydgoszez, a Pravda editorial cited Brezhnev's 
harsh rhetoric about Poland at the CPSU Congress.
22 March Soviet press disarray on whether Walesa made an 
"instigatory" statement in Bydgoszcz.
22 March Pravda cited without criticism the West German 
Foreign Minister's praise of the Polish leader's 
nonviolent internal course.
23 March CPSU Secretary Ponomarev in Kommunist deplored 
the idea of power-sharing in a socialist society.
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26-29 March 
26 March
29 March
30 March
2 April
3 April
3 and 4 April
4 April
5 April
7 April 
7 April
Pravda criticized Solidarity and Polish media for 
gravely disrupting public order. A rare personal 
criticism of Walesa surfaced on the 27th.
USSR Defense Ministry journal Vovcnnvv Vestnik 
compared the Polish events to those in 
Czechoslovakia 1968.
U.S. State Department reported signs of Soviet 
military moves for possible armed intervention in 
Poland.
Unsuccessful challenge to Kania by hardliners 
Grabski and Olszowski concealed in TASS report of 
Polish Central Committee session.
Pravda alleged PUWP tolerance of anti-Soviet 
seminar at Warsaw University.
Bydgoszcz Solidarity leader Rulewski accused of a 
criminal past and pro-Nazi family ties in Pravda.
U.S. media cited intelligence sources to effect that 
Soviet military was upgrading its capability for 
rapid action against Poland.
Soviet press discordance on the chances of a Polish 
solution to Poland's crisis.
Izvestiva claimed Solidarity "terror" and lack of 
effective regime resistance to "creeping counter­
revolution."
Brezhnev voiced qualified confidence in Polish 
leaders during a speech to the Czechoslovak Party 
Congress.
TASS announced the end of Warsaw Pact exercises.
8 8
7 April U.S. Slate Department reported unusual levels of 
Warsaw Pact military activity, increases in Soviet 
troops near Poland, the establishment of a Soviet 
communications and command network, and supply 
stockpiles in Poland.
13 and 16 April Pravda informed that at the East German Party 
Congress Suslov ignored Poland while Bulgarian 
guest speaker Doynov gave the confidence-in- 
Poland line.
2  Ju n e Pravda favorably cited an attack on Polish 
Politburo guidelines for the special Party 
Congress by the hardline Katowice Party Forum.
5 June CPSU Central Committee Letter to Polish Central 
Committee criticized Kariia and Jaruzelski by 
name for pursuing a "policy of concession and 
compromise." Polish leadership needed 
"revolutionary will" to "reverse the course of 
events."
11 June Marshal Bapramvan in Znamva recalled the Red 
Army's low-damage campaign to liberate Poland 
in 1944.
12 June Pravda ran the Kremlin Letter to Warsaw and 
failed to summarize Kania's essentially moderate 
speech to the Polish Central Committee session 
held 9-10 June.
20 June Zamyatin on Moscow TV saw the Polish situation 
as worsening and urged vigorous corrective 
measures.
22 June Marshal Kulikov in Red Star assailed 
"counterrevolutionary forces" in Poland.
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23-24 June USSR Supreme Soviet met without the usual 
preliminary meeting of the CPSU Central 
Committee.
25 June Prav da and Red Star differed on the gravity of 
Polish events in comment on a World War U 
anniversary.
25 June In contrast to Zamvatin on 20 June. Agitator 
claimed that Polish leaders were implementing 
resolution of their 9-10 June Plenum and positive 
results were a cause for rejoicing.
25, 29, 30 June Polish media reported Polish-Soviet military 
exercises and the East German press reported 
military maneuvers in G.D.R.
3-5 July Gromyko met with Polish leaders in Warsaw and 
heard about the PUWP Congress preparations.
The limited sovereignty doctrine was restated in 
communique.
11 July Pravda gave far more coverage to a four-hour 
strike of Polish airlines workers than a Polish 
Central Committee session recommiting PUWP to 
democratize itself.
15 July Pravda ran Kania's report and Soviet Politburo 
member Grishin's speech to the Polish Party 
Congrev. Reformist and nationalist lines omitted 
from Kania text. Grishin warned against rejection 
of the Soviet model of governance.
19 July Brezhnev's congratulatory message to Kania on 
occasion of his re-election as Party head did not 
laud him.
19 July Western subversion against Poland was "proven" 
by a Czechoslovak intelligence officer at a press 
conference in Pra, ue reported by Pravda.
9 0
21 July
22 July
25 July 
31 July 
31 July
5 August 
7 August
7 August
8 August 
13-14 August
Pravda did not list the Mines of Polish Politburo 
and Secretariat members elected by the new 
Polish Central Committee.
Pravda showed Grishin in his Warsaw speech 
more uncertain about Polish leaders' competence 
than were colleagues who greeted the same 
leaders in connection with their national day.
Defense Minister Ustinov in a Pravda article cited 
the Polish events as an example of "direct threat 
to the security of the USSR and its allies."
Pravda version of PUWP Congress resolution 
edited to accent orthodoxy, disregarding criticism 
of systematic ills and remedial formulas.
Pravda theory article by Kommunist editor 
Kosolapov rebuked Communists blind to danger 
in Poland and portrayed Walesa as a great hope 
of anti-Communists in the West.
Pravda reported anti-regime street 
demonstrations in Warsaw.
The last article by Pravda's Warsaw 
correspondent about PUWP cell activities until 
imposition of martial law in December.
Polish leaders reportedly got letters from Soviet, 
East German and Czechoslovak leaders urging 
reassertion of authority and offering technical 
assistance for that purpose.
Marshal Kulikov met with Jaruzelski in Warsaw.
Pravda coverage of Polish Central Committee 
meeting held on August 11. Kania's readiness to
9 1
14 August
16 August
31 August- 
3 September
1 September
4-12 September 
5 September
7 September
8 September
12, 13, 19, 22, 24 
September
discuss change of the constitution toward 
democracy was ignored.
Pravda announced Soviet military maneuvers led 
by Defense Minister Ustinov for 4-12 September, 
or during Solidarity Congress's first stage.
Communique of Soviet-Polish summit in Crimea 
featured by Pravda. Brezhnev withheld an 
expression of confidence in Polish leaders.
Oen. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' 
Main Political Directorate, visited Poland, met 
with Kania and Jaruzelski.
Pravda ^ jted Jan lski's irritation over social 
unrest during speech at military college: "Enough 
of this disintegration!"
USSR hosted "Zapad-81" military exercises.
TASS reported Jaruzelski among allied military 
leaders at Ustinov's war-gamos headquarters in 
Belorussia.
CPSU Secretariat official Rakhmanin in Voprosy 
Istorii KPSS voiced confidence that PUWP leaders 
could solve their internal problems.
Unlike Voorosv Istorii KPSS article by 
Rakhmanin, one by V. Chernyshev in Partivnava 
Zhizn ignored Kania and Jaruzelski, as well as the 
confidence-in-Poles line, and warned of NATO 
plans to seize Polish territory.
Pravdk reported factory meetings in USSR voiced 
extreme anger over Solidarity Congress (5-10 
September). Polish workers were exhorted to 
throw false friends onto "the refuse heap of 
history."
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19 September Pravda summarized a CPSU Central Committee 
and USSR Government Statement given to Kania 
and Jaruzelski by Soviet ambassador Aristov. An 
immediate halt to anti-Sovietism in Poland was 
demanded.
22 September Jaruzelski received Gen. Gribkov, Chief of Staff of 
the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.
22 September Soviet Gosplan chief Baybakov began a 5-day 
visit to Poland and reportedly threatened to 
curtail raw material exports to Poland if its 
economic slump continued.
22-25 S'otember Pravda denounced Solidarity as a facist-style 
body with close Church ties and nearing a 
takeover of State power.
29 September- 
11 October
Pravda comment on Solidarity Congress (27 
September-8 October). Union activists were said 
to be anticipating "martial law and outside 
intervention."
13 October TASS announced that a Polish Central Committee 
meeting would open on 16 October.
13 October "A. Petrov" in Pravda ridiculed the Kania-linked 
slogan of "socialist renewal" and urged "effective 
rebuff to counterrevolution" in Poland. The 
limited sovereignty (Brezhnev) doctrine was 
reiterated.
14 October TASS reported a Warsaw regional PUWP plenum 
which accused Solidarity of seeking confrontation 
and political dominance, using regime mistakes; 
Polish authorities were hit for lack of consistency 
and effectiveness. Decisive steps were needed to 
guard socialism.
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13 October E u u k  text of Suslov speech at ideology 
conference in Moscow assured that Polish 
Communists could rely on Soviet support in 
struggle with counterrevolutionary forces.
18-20 October Pravda coverage of 16-18 October Polish Central 
Committee session. Kanin's resignation was 
accepted and Jaruzelski elected to head the 
PUWP. Jaruzelski's speech was the only one 
repotted at length in Pravda. along with the 
plenum's stiff resolution.
19 October Brezhnev's cable of congratulations to Jaruzelski 
expressed trust that at "this historic moment" he 
would use his "great prestige" to roll back 
"encroachments of counterrevolution."
10 October Marshal Kulikov met with O.D.R. Party leader 
Honecker in East Berlin.
22 October USSR Interior Minister Army Oen. Shchelokov 
met with Honecker in East Berlin.
27 October Partiynava Zhizn alleged "ransackings of the 
premises of State bodies" throughout Poland.
30 October Pravda omitted from its version of Jaruzelski's 
speech to the Polish Central Committee his 
professed intent to broaden the Government's 
coalition dimension.
4 November Jaruzelski, Walesa and Primate Glemp held an 
unprecedented summit. Pravda ignored the 
event.
3 November Pravda ran the Statement of a Soviet bloc 
ideology conference, which backed PUWP's 
"struggle against the antipeople forces of 
counterrevolution and anarchy."
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6 November Ustinov stressed in his report for Bolshevik 
Revolution day that counterrevolutionaries would 
not win in Poland and resolve was growing there 
to rebuff antisocialist forces.
14 November Pravda review of readers' letters hinted 
impatience with toleration of Solidarity by the 
Polish regime.
16 November Brezhnev spoke to the CPSU Central Committee 
Plenum. A summary ignored Poland.
20 November Pravda began a series of attacks on Solidarity for 
campaigning to evict Party committees from 
industrial works.
23 November Ustinov and Andropov outranked Chernenko in a 
Pravda photograph with top leadership line-up. 
Chernenko that same day made a Soviet election 
speech and referred to Poland without 
mentioning "crisis," "counterrevolutionaries" or 
"antisocialist forces."
23 November Marshal Kulikov met with Jaruzelski in Warsaw.
4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 
December
Pravda directlv attacked Walesa as a political 
extremist.
7 December Kommunist editorial linked events in Hungary 
1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968 with those in 
Poland. "Acute class struggle" was said to be 
raging among Poles. Czechoslovak Party 
Secretary Biiak in an article for Brezhnev's 73th 
birthday quoted him on the used to "smash and 
destroy" counterrevolution.
10 December Pravda ran a TASS item without dateline accusing 
Solidarity of arming itself for a coup and giving 
specific dates on which anti-regime actions would 
be undertaken (17 and 20 Dec.). Soviet
9 5
13 December
communication lines through Poland were 
allegedly targeted by "counterrevolutionaries.” 
Also, a Pravda "historical" article asserted the 
necessity of repressing internal foes of socialism.
Radio Moscow reported a state of emergency was 
invoked in Poland. Soviet media were silent on 
Marshal Kulikov's reported presence in Poland.
Chronology iwurce: Ploss 157-169.
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Appendix 2
"TO THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE."
Pravda, 12 June 1981, 2.
Dear Comrades! The CC of the CPSU, out of a feeling of deep anxiety 
for the fate of socialism in Poland and for Poland as a free and 
independent state, addresses this letter to you.
Our appeal is dictated by comradely interest in the affairs of the 
party of Polish Communists, the entire fraternal Polish people and socialist 
Poland as a member of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Aid. Soviet and Polish Communists stood shoulder to shoulder in 
the battle against fascism and have been together throughout the post-war 
years. Our Party and the Soviet People helped their Polish comrades to 
build a new life. And we cannot but be alarmed at the mortal danger that 
hangs over the Polish people's revolutionary gains today.
Let us say frankly that some tendencies in the development of the 
Polish People's Republic, especially in the fields of ideology and economic 
policy of its former leadership, have given us concern for a number of 
years. In full accordance with the spirit of the relations that have evolved 
between the CPSU and the PUWP, the Polish leaders were told about this 
during summit talks and at other meetings. Unfortunately, these friendly 
warnings, like the sharply critical statements made within the PUWP itself, 
were not taken into consideration and were even ignored. As a result, a 
profound crisis has broken out in Poland, one that has extended to all 
political and economic life in the country.
The change in the PUWP's leadership and the endeavor to overcome 
the flagrant errors related to violations of the laws governing the 
construction of socialism, to restore the confidence of the masses-of the
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working class first of all- in the party, and to strengthen socialist 
democracy met with out full understanding. From the first days of the 
crisis, we considered it important that the party administer a resolute 
rebuff to attempts by the enemies of socialism to take advantage of the 
difficulties that arose for their own far-reaching aims. However, this has 
not been done. Endless concessions to the antisocialist forces and their 
importunities have led us to a situation in which the PUWP has retreated 
step by step under the onslaught of internal cpunterrevolution, which 
relies on the support of imperialist subversion centers abroad.
Today the situation is not simply dangerous, it has brought the 
country to a critical point-no other evaluation is possible. The enemies of 
socialist Poland are making no special effort to hide their intentions; they 
are waging a struggle for power, and are already seizing it. One position 
after another is falling under their control. The counterrevolution is using 
the extremist wing of Solidarity as its strike force, employing deception to 
draw the workers who have joined this trade union association into a 
criminal conspiracy against the people's power. A wave of anti­
communism and anti-Sovietism is mounting. The imperialist forces are 
making increasingly brazen attempts to interfere in Polish affairs.
The extremely serious danger that hangs over socialism in Poland is 
also a threat to the very existence of the independent Polish state. If the 
worst happened and the enemies of socialism came to power, if Poland was 
deprived of the protection of the socialist commonwealth, the imperialists' 
greedy hands would at once reach out for it. And who then could 
guarantee the independence, sovereignty and borders of Poland as a state? 
No (me.
Comrades, you know about the December 5, 1980 meeting in Moscow 
of leaders of the fraternal parties of the countries of the socialist 
commonwealth. On March 4, 1981, the Soviet leadership held talks with 
the PUWP delegation to the 26th CPSU Congress. On April 23, 1981, a CPSU 
delegation met with the entire Polish leadership. During all these 
meetings, and also in other contacts, our side emphasized its growing 
concern in connection with the intrigues of counterrevolutionary forces in 
Poland. We spoke about the need to overcome the confusion in the PUWP's
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ranks, to firmly defend its cadres against enemy attacks, and to stand up 
staunchly in defense of the people's power.
Special attention was called to the fact that the enemy had virtually 
taken control of the mass news media, the overwhelming majority of 
which have become tools of anti-socialist activity used to undermine 
socialism and to demoralize the party. It was noted that it is impossible to 
v/in the battle for the party as long as the press, radio and television are 
working not for the PUWP but for its enemies.
The pointed question was raised of the need to strengthen the 
prestige in the country of agencies of public order and the army and to 
protect Hem from encroachments by counterrevolutionary forces. To 
per utempts to defame and demoralize the security agencies, the police 
and then the army to be crowned with success would mean, in effect, to 
disarm the socialist state, to put it at the mercy of the class enemy.
We want to emphasize that S. Kania, W. Jaruzelski, and other Polish 
comrades voiced agreement with our opinions on all the questions raised. 
But in fact everything remains as it was, and no corrections have been 
made in the policy of concessions and compromises. One position made 
after another is being surrendered. Despite the fact that the materials of 
the recent plenary sessions of the PUWP CC recognize the fact of the 
counterrevolutionary threat, no actual steps to combat it have been taken 
so far, and the counterrevolution's organizers are not even being named 
directly.
The situation within the PUWP itself has recently become a matter of 
special concern. A little over a month remains before the congress. 
However, the tone of the election campaign is increasingly being set by 
forces that are hostile to socialism. The fact that frequently casual people 
who openly profess opportunistic views become the leaders of local party 
organizations and are among the delegates to conferences and the congress 
can only cause concern. As a result of various manipulations by the 
PUWP's enemies and by revisionists and opportunists, experienced 
personnel who are devoted to the party's cause and have unblemished 
reputation and moral qualifications are being shunted aside.
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The fact that, among the delegates to the forthcoming congress, the 
number of Communists with a worker's background is extremely small is 
also alarming. The course of preparations for the congress is complicated 
by the so-called movement of horizontal structures-a tool for splitting the 
party that is being used by opportunists to get people they want picked for 
the congress and divert its work into a channel advantageous to them. One 
cannot exclude the possibility that an attempt may be made at the 
congress itself to decisively defeat the Marxist-Leninist forces of the party 
in order to liquidate it.
We would like to make special mention of the fact that in recent 
months counterrevolutionary forces have been actively spreading all kinds 
of anti-Soviet fabrications designed to nullify the fruits of the work done 
by our parties and to revive nationalistic, anti-Soviet sentiments in various 
strata of Polish society. These slanderers and liars stop at nothing. They 
even claim that the Soviet Union is "plundering" Poland. They say this, 
despite the fact that the Soviet Union has given and is continuing to give 
enormous additional material assistance to Poland in the difficult time.
They say this about a country that, with its deliveries of petroleum, gas, 
ore and cotton at prices one-third to one-half lower than world prices, is to 
all intents and purposes provisioning the main branches of Polish industry.
Esteemed Comrades! In addressing this letter to you, we proceed not 
only from our concern over the situation in fraternal Poland and over the 
conditions of and prospects for further Soviet-Polish cooperation. We, as 
well as the fraternal parties, are no less concerned about the fact that the 
offensive of hostile anti-socialist forces in the PPR threatens the interests 
of our entire commonwealth, its cohesion, its integrity, and the security of 
its borders. Yes, our common security. Imperialist reaction, which 
supports and encourages the Polish counterrevolution, does not conceal its 
hope of thus sharply changing in its favor the alignment of forces in 
Europe and in the world.
Imperialism is actively using the crisis in Poland to discredit the 
socialist system and the ideals and principles of socialism and to make new 
attacks against the international communist movement.
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Thus, the PUWP bean a historic responsibility not only for the fate of 
its homeland, its independence and progress and the cause of socialism in 
Poland. Comrades, you also bear an enormous responsibility for the 
common interests of the socialist commonwealth.
We believe that there is still a possibility of staving off the wont, of 
preventing national catastrophe. There are in the PUWP many honest and 
steadfast Communists who are in fact ready to struggle for the ideals of 
Marxism-Leninism, for and independent Poland. There are many people in 
Poland who are devoted to the cause of socialism. The country's working 
class and working people, even those who are being drawn by deception 
into the enemies machinations, will ultimately follow the party.
The question is to mobilize all the healthy forces of society to repulse 
the class enemy, to combat the counterrevolution. This requires, first of 
all, revolutionary determination on the part of the party itself, its aktiv 
and its leadership. Yes, leadership. There's no time to be lost. The party 
can and must find in itself the strength to change the course of events and, 
even before the Ninth PUWP Congress, direct them into the proper channel.
We would like to be confident that the CC of the fraternal Polish 
party of Communists will measure up to its historic responsibility!
We want to assure you, dear comrades, that in these difficult days, as 
always in the past, the CPSU CC, all Soviet Communists and the entire 
Soviet people are in sympathy with your struggle. Our position was clearly 
expressed in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statement at the 26th CPSU 
Congress: "We will not abandon socialist Poland, fraternal Poland in its time 
of trouble-we will stand by itl"
Signed: THE CC OF THE CPSU.
Source o f translation: Soviet Foreign Policy Today (Selections from the C urrent 
Digest o f the Soviet Press), (Columbus, Ohio: 1983), 149-50, rpt. in Wozniuk 135-138.
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Appendix 3
Excerpts from Gorbachev's Strasbourg 
Speech 6 July 1989
It is not enough now to merely state the interdependence and joint 
destinies of the European states. The idea of European unity should be 
collectively rethought in the process of the concerted endeavor by all 
nations, large, medium and small.
Is it realistic to raise this question? I know that many people in the 
West regard the existence of two social systems as the major difficulty. 
But the difficulty is rather in the very common conviction, or even a 
political directive, that overcoming the split of Europe implies the 
"overcoming of socialism.” This is a course toward confrontation, if not 
worse. There will be no European unity along these lines.
The belonging of European states to different social systems is a 
reality. Recognition of this historical fact and respect for the sovereign 
right of every nation to choose freely a social system constitute the major 
prerequisite for a normal European process.
Competition Is Healthy
Social and political orders in one country or another changed in the 
past and may change in the future. But this change is the exclusive affair 
of the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in 
domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states* 
friends, allies or any others * are inadmissible.
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Differences among states are not removable. They are, as I have 
already said on several occasions, even favorable, provided, of course, that 
the competition between the different types of society is directed at 
creating better material and spiritual living conditions for all people.
Due to its restructuring, the U.S.S.R. will be able fully to take part in 
this honest, equitable and constructive competition. Given all the existing 
shortcomings and lagging, we well know the intrinsic strengths of our 
social system. And we are sure that we will be able to put them to use for
the benefit of ourselves and for the benefit of Europe.
File Away the Cold War
It is time to deposit in the archives the postulates of the cold war 
period, when Europe was regarded as an arena of confrontation, divided 
into "spheres of influence," and somebody's "outpost," and as an object of 
military rivalry, a battlefield. In today's interdependent world, the 
geopolitical notions born of another era turn out to be just as useless in
real politics as the laws of classical mechanics in quantum theory.
Meanwhile, it is on the basis of out-dated stereotypes that the Soviet 
Union is suspected of planning domination and intending to tear the United 
States away from Europe. There are some who would like to place the 
U.S.S.R. outside Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, by limiting its 
expanse "from Brest to Brest." The U.S.S.R., it is alleged, is too big for 
coexistence. Others would feel ill at ease with it. The present-day realities 
and prospects for the foreseeable future are obvious. The U.S.S.R. and the 
United States constitute a natural part of the European international- 
political structure. And their participation in its evolution in not only 
justified, but is also historically determined.
The philosophy of the "common European home" concept rules out 
the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use of 
force or threat of force - alliance against alliance, inside the alliances, 
wherever. This philosophy suggests that a doctrine of restraint should
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take the place of the doctrine of deterrence. This is not just a play on 
words but the logic of European development prompted by life itself.
Our goals at the Vienna talks are well known. We consider it quite 
attainable - and the U.S. President, too, supports this - to secure a 
substantially lower level of armaments in Europe in the course of two- 
three years, with the elimination of all asymmetries and imbalances, of 
course. And I emphasize - all asymmetries and imbalances. No double 
standards are admissible here.
We are convinced that it is also time to begin talks on tactical nuclear 
systems between all countries concerned. The ultimate objective is to fully 
remove the weapons, which threaten only the Europeans, who by no 
means intend to wage war on one another. Who then needs them, and 
what for?
To eliminate nuclear arsenals or to keep them at all costs are the 
options. Does the strategy of nuclear deterrence strengthen or undermine 
stability? The positions of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty on these issues 
look diametrically opposed. However we do not dramatize the 
divergences.
SUge-by-Stage Approach
We are looking for and invite our partners to look for ways out. We 
regard the elimination of nuclear weapons as a stage-by-stage process. 
Without abandoning their positions, the Europeans can jointly cover part of 
the way separating us from the complete elimination of nuclear weapons: 
the U.S.S.R. while remaining loyal to non-nuclear ideals, and the West while 
remaining committed to the concept of "minimum deterrence."
However, it is worthwhile to find out what is behind the "minimum" 
notion and where is the limit beyond which the potential of nuclear 
deterrence turns into an attack capability. There is much ambiguity in this 
respect, while the lack of clarity is a source of mistrust.
Why don't the experts of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain 
and France, as well as the countries on whose territories nuclear weapons 
are stationed, discuss these issues in depth? If they arrive at some
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common evaluations, the problem would become simpler at the political 
level as well.
If the NATO countries are teen to be ready to enter into negotiations 
with us on tactical nuclear weapons, we could, upon taking counsel with 
our allies, of course, make further unilateral cuts in our tactical nuclear 
missiles in Europe without delay.
Source: n «w York Tim—. 7 July 1919, Sec A: 6.
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